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The Fall of Contemplation and The Rise ofThe Social Realm
Zachary Anton Reznichek
As a corrupted byproduct of socioeconomic politics, curriculum philosophy is
unsuitable to solve its own problems or reform itself. Leaving the educational field, I
consider the foundation of education through a political philosophy frame. Using Hannah
Arendt's The Human Condition to differentiate between active living and merely existing,
I explore the pre-Socratic definitions of authenticity, politics, freedom, plurality, public,
private, labor, work and action. With this political framework, I investigate the rise of the
social realm from the fall of the public and private realms in three key historic periods:
Ancient Greece's 4th Century B.C.E. shift from democracy to empire; the institution of
neo-Platonism as Catholicism in the 4th Century A.D. to redeem the Roman empire; and
the 1 9th Century lapse into modern consumerism from Marx's inability to reconcile the
economic alienation ofthe Industrial Revolution. I show that the rise ofWestern society
has galvanized essentialism and fostered a disconnect with authenticity and our human
senses. I identify the anxiety created by the conditioned feeling that one cannot trust one's
own senses is the catalyst of existentialism. I run authenticity through the existential
frame ofplurality, ambiguity and existential self-validation. It becomes evident that
contemplation is the missing element in curriculum philosophy. I review two curriculum
initiatives that I believe foster contemplation in students: Transcendental Meditation in
schools and Outward Bound educational adventure trips. I make recommendations of
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The problem is that we do not make developing an authentic way of living the priority of
curriculum philosophy studies. In curriculum philosophy and in the curriculum that is
actually taught, we do not properly distinguish the difference between authenticity
derived from the self and authenticity derived from the auspices of external dictates.
Education is entangled with morality such that authenticity, as we know it, is only a
derivative of a philosophy we do 'right' or 'genuinely' ' - but that does not mean our lives
themselves are authentic nor does it guarantee that the philosophies that we subscribe to
are committed to self-development. At the post-graduate level, there are discussions (yet
rarely in my experience) ofauthenticity, that which is authentic and how something may
or may not be authenticated and why something is authentic or inauthentic, but inquiries
come too late when how we are living has already crystallized (into policy). This
excessive degree of abstraction shows we do not have a grasp on the problem of
authenticity. And what would be more important to education than developing an
authentic life?
' Afterall, why do people swear on a book of ideas? 'Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?' The self is not trusted to be realized or authentic. What the self
proclaims must be authenticated by an external reference.
?
Introduction
I have narrowed my investigation of authenticity to three philosophical concepts found
within existentialism: existentialism (itself), ambiguity, and plurality. In order to clarify
the complexity of these concepts, I will review the literature in the first three chapters of
this thesis. In the fourth chapter, I will expand on two congruent curriculum initiatives.
Throughout this document, I will refer to humans as dual-gendered (i.e. 'he or she' 'his or
hers'), but in the case of citations, I will leave their original forms (which are usually
masculine), or adapt them with brackets (i.e. [his ör Tiers}.
I will begin in the first chapter by outlining Hannah Arendt's (1958) conception of
the vita activa (v.a.) - the three basic human conditions: labor, work and action from her
book The Human condition2.
In chapter two, I will review Arendt's discussion of the hierarchical shifts within
the vita activa and between the v.a. and vita contemplativa (v.c.) that she claims brought
about the modern social realm3. To describe the social's formation we will review three
key Western historical events: the collapse ofthe public realm in Ancient Greece, the
collapse of the private realm by Roman Catholicism, and the perpetual consumer
machine ofour inauthentic modern social-economy. Through this narrative, I will review
what Arendt calls the reversal of contemplation and action4. 1 will highlight how action is
subverted by the devaluation of the intrinsic-self for the marketable-self galvanized by
the cumbersome pretexts ofmorality that eclipse the possibility for authentic living.
In chapter three, I will discuss the importance of existentialism as the movement
that reawakened the demand for authenticity. In reviews ofAbraham Kaplan's (1961)




chapter "Existentialism" in The New world ofphilosophy5, Walter Kaufmann's (1956)
Existentialismfrom Dostoevsky to Sartre6, and Van Cleaf Morris' (1966) Existentialism in
education: What it means7, 1 will analyze what is so authentic to existentialists about
existence preceding essence; that freedom lies in responsible plurality; and that ambiguity
distances the self from essentialism provoking empowerment, reform and existentialism.
In chapter four, I will review two educational initiatives that strive toward
authentic living. In consideration of living contemplatively, I will look at The David
Lynch Foundation's Quiet Time / Transcendental Meditation Program8 that provides
reflective time in schools. In consideration of living actively, I will review the Outward
Bound Program9 that takes students into the natural environment where they actively
learn and experience a sharp contrast between their urban social lives and living in raw
nature. I will make suggestions for combining elements of the two programs to expand
practically on the basics of a functioning authentic curriculum philosophy.
IfI have supported my thesis well, in the hopes of stimulating new lines of
discourse, I will provide three challenges to the current precepts of curriculum philosophy.
First, it should be clear that morality must be demoted to a lesser resource in self-
development and educational philosophy must be promoted to a primary resource
properly conjoined with political philosophy. Meaning, the articulation of 'freedom' must
be clarified as more than just buying time and space from the encroachment ofnecessities
and maintenance. 'Politics' must be clarified as more than just a struggle for power. And
5 Kaplan, Abraham. The New world ofphilosophy. New York: Vintage Books, 1 96 1 .
6 Kaufmann, Walter. Existentialismfrom Dostoevsky to Sartre. New York: Meridian Books, 1956.
7 Morris, Van Cleve. Existentialism in education: What it means. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
8 ©Transcendental Meditation and TM are service marks registered in the US patent and trademark office,
licensed to Maharishi Vedic Development Corporation and used under sublicense.
9 Outward Bound was founded by Kurt Hahn and Sir Lawrence Holt in 1941.
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both 'freedom' and 'politics' must be released from any morality mechanism promising
salvation. Second, ifpublic education is to be authentic, it must explicitly identify the
problem ofpromotion and reliance on external validation as primary and provide a
practical means for students to investigate self-authentification whereby the educational
institute itself (its philosophy, agenda, budget, policies, interests) is the primary open-
book example. Third, in order to foster authentic active political human beings, public
education must deliver a practical means for students to parallel their inner struggle to
develop themselves [through self-authentification (contemplation), via guidance to
internalize the vita activa (to balance labor, work and action)] with the outer struggle of
individuals, interest groups, governments, and private enterprises to develop political
bodies and maintain the public sphere, where the self is the model and the free market is a
reference, but is not the model. A clear goal in all challenges is to realize the social
economy is non-political (as it is the results ofpolitical collapse) and that real politics and
freedom come from the communal rejection of a subjectively willed freedom and a
reformulation of "the notion of human rights by thinking a notion of power and right that
is not tied to the notions of sovereignty and national citizenship."10 Otherwise, the need to
do so, as is explored in this paper, implies the absence ofpolitics and therefore may lead
to tyranny. To dispel inauthenticity, the false promise of freedom by earning moral credit
through conformity in the consumer market for salvation in an 'afterlife' must be razed
along with the façade that the modern social economy is political.
Peg Birmingham. Hannah Arendt and Human Rights. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p.54. 2006.
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Chapter 1 - What is the vita activai
To properly respect the foresight and precision that Hannah Arendt brings to the
discourse of authenticity requires a mental gymnastics of careful unfolding and attention
to the structure ofher writing as though it were an origami crane that will need to be put
back together again. Margaret Canovan (1998), in her introduction of the recently
repackaged second edition of The Human Condition, credits Arendt with her own unique,
uncategorizable philosophical style. "Concerned with the setting for politics rather than
politics itself" this "long, complex piece ofwriting that conforms to no established
pattern... [with] more intertwined strands of thought than can possibly be followed at first
reading, and even repeated readings are liable to bring surprises" works directly on the
reader. "Her political theory is not simply there to be picked... it has to be literally
unearthed and sifted... and then cast into an argument about politics."13 Why go through
all this? I chose The Human Condition as my primary reference, because it is concerned
with the problem of authenticity even if it challenges convention. Maurizio D'Entreves
remarks, "Against tradition Arendt sets the criterion of genuineness, against the
authoritative that which is forgotten, concealed, or displaced at the margins ofhistory."
Among a variety ofways to approach authenticity from the standpoint ofpolitical
philosophy, I have chosen15 to start by reviewing the components ofwhat Arendt (1958)
11 Margaret Canovan, Margaret. "Introduction". In The Human condition, 2nd Ed., Hannah Arendt (Author),
p.ix. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1998.
12 Canovan, 1998, pp.v/7-xr.
13 Shiraz Dossa. The Public Realm and the public self. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press,
p.9. 1989.
14 D'Entreves, Maurizio. "Hannah Arendt", The Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, 2006, URL = <
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arendt/>.
15 Although an argument for Arendt's biases can be formulated, I was looking for someone with an
objective bird's eye view with a sober sense of laying out why people do what they do (ethics) in a
narrative style. Choosing to focus on character, events, resistance and responsibility, Arendt seemed the
5
calls the human condition. According to Arendt, the human condition is made up of
three principal components: labor, work, and action. Although some jumping around in
the historical contextualization oí labor, work, and action in this chapter and the next will
be unavoidable, I will do my best to highlight Arendt's meticulous dissection of the forms
labor, work, and action have taken as she peels back the layers ofhistorical shifts of
political perception, interpretation and policy. Along the way, to properly define each of
the conditions within the vita activa, I must clarify how they fit within and cross over
between the public and private realms.
Labor and Work
Labor defines the activity involved in ensuring a base existence of survival and
consumption . . .until further need of survival and consumption. Similar to any animal
species, basic human existence centers on the private labor of family and the home.
Interaction with others is communally obligatory as a means of survival. To maintain the
survival of the family, everyone dependent on the shelter, food, and safety of the private
home must toil together. However, there is^ more to the human condition than just labor.
Even animals are capable of laboring.
As humans establish order(s), form routine agendas and cultivate tools, labor
becomes more efficient (i.e., reusable, seasonal, time reducing, etc..) and productive.
Populations of humans start to distinguish themselves from the natural landscape by
producing artifacts like fences, silos, workshops, and aqueducts. Arendt identifies this
productive change in human active life as work.




Self-awareness sets humans in a different classification from animals because an
inner (phenomenological) dialogue of feelings, smells, noises, tastes and visuals takes on
referential symbology18. As these symbols are manifested outwardly between human
beings, language is formed to define the world through which they navigate themselves.
To define him or herself, Arendt says, a human needs language19. The 'world' humans
define through language, she asserts, distinguishes them from animals.
By making artificial shelters, storing and preserving food and making primary
considerations for efficiency and production, humans go against the 'caH ofthe wild',
altering their conditions and existence by not going with the natural20 course of migration
and the seasons. Thus, Arendt proposes what she herself calls an "unusual" distinction
between labor and work.
Arendt reports that although the terms have become often synonymous, there has
always been a Western linguistic difference, in Greek (jponein and ergazesthai), Latin
(laborare andfabrican), German (arbeiten and werken), and French (labourer/travailler
and ouvrer), between labor and work22. In each case, labor is (1) done by the body, (2)
associated with pain and tori, (3) incomplete and therefore itself traceless, and (4) as a
noun, in process23 and "never designates the finished product, the result of laboring, but
17 Self-perception in the natural environment and through a 'drive' to overcome various natural 'laws' via
inner reflection of outward experience (which is not, at least, initially premeditative).
18 Symbols inwardly represent self-placement in a linear (time) and geographical (space) manner -
simultaneously differentiating between past, present and future and accommodating the conception of
being, having been and going to be in different places.
19 Arendt, 1958, p. 82.
20 Although efforts are now being made to exist more consciously, ergonomically, organically, and in
harmony with nature, humans do not naturally or automatically preserve or maintain eco-systems.
21 Arendt, p. 72.
22 Ibid., p.72; p.322, footnote 3.
23 Ibid., p.72-74; p.322 [3].
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remains a verbal noun to be classed with the gerund." Work (a) has an intellectual
component, (b) is associated with craft, (c) creates artifice and monument and is therefore
traceable, and (d) is, as a noun, complete25. One never says, 'Come and see the labor I
did'; one may however say, 'Come and see the work I did.' Ultimately, Arendt points out
that although modernity has argued the difference between productive and unproductive
labor; skilled and unskilled work; and manual and intellectual labor, only the distinction
between the first pair "goes to the heart of the matter, and it is no accident that. . . Adam
Smith and Karl Marx based the whole structure of their argument upon it."26 Because
survival depends on it, Arendt reasons, labor can be glorified and upset the hierarchical
perception between labor and work - this was Marx "hoping all the time that only one
more step was needed to eliminate labor and necessity altogether." This becomes
especially relevant when we see that 'necessity' is tied to tyranny in Chapter 2.
Arendt further elaborates her definition of labor. To fend off glorified ideas of
'labor' in the Herculean28 sense, Arendt clarifies that it is "the daily fight in which the
human body is engaged to keep the world clean and prevent its decay bears little
resemblance to heroic deeds; the endurance it needs to repair every day anew the waste of
yesterday is repetition."29 This endurance of repetition makes us, in labor, an animal
laborans, "which with its body and the help of tame animals nourishes life, may be the
lord and master of all living creatures,"30 but is still only the custodian ofnature and earth.
By contrast, homofaber, man the worker, "conducts himself as lord and master of the
24 Ibid., p.72.
25 Ibid., p.72-74; p.322 [3].
26 Ibid., p.76.
27 Ibid., p.77.
28 Especially the Hercules' task to clean out Augeas' stables among the Twelve Labours.
29 Arendt, 1958, p.87.
30Ibid., p. 122.
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whole earth,"31 'works upon', fabricates and reifies natural materials through violence
and extraction, "erecting a man-made world only after destroying part of God-created
nature."32 Labor exhausts, 'pains', often overwhelms and only promises more of the same.
Arendt makes the case that beyond the pride of doing a job, the 'joys of labor' are again a
misnomer because it is by the elemental experiences ofhuman strength, courage, and
danger involved in work that we receive self-assurance, satisfaction and a measure of the
self versus the elements33 - all ofwhich can be multiplied by tools .
Arendt points out that, where the repetition of laboring to eat and eating ta labor
follows the cycle ofbiological metabolism (consumption), work represents multiplication
in three ways35. One, tools extract materials to be used not consumed - multiplying
resources. Two, tools make more tools and don't get used up in the process. Three, what
is made has permanence and multiplies the sense of the world.
In work, the model or image of the object is there before and after the object is
produced. This becomes important because a permanent idea can be a model upon which
others can be inwardly built. For example, through work on the inner-self, one can strive
to become a 'model citizen' or strive to attain and maintain idealized qualities. As certain
qualities are 'extracted' as useful resources, they are not consumed but rather put to
repeated use multiplying ideology publicly and in their next ofkin. The more this
'behaviour' is embraced and rewarded, the more concretely and permanently these
human tools build an external existence or world. There will be extended discussion on
multiplying ideals in Chapter 2.
31 Ibid., p. 122.
32IWd., pp.1 19-122
33IWd., pp.87,88, 123.
34IWd., pp. 122- 123.
35IWd., p. 124- 125.
As animal laborans tames and shapes nature, homofaber is at odds with nature,
violently extracting materials for tools to make both labor and work more efficient and
less dangerous. Through their character, these tools, these durable and permanent
products - including language - define the world. Although labor-made products are
produced, consumed and disappear, we become used to and accustomed to work-made
products that "give rise to the familiarity ofthe world, its customs and habits of
intercourse between men and things as well as between men and men." To homofaber,
what is made gives a sense of accomplishment because it remains and is built and
expanded upon. The animal laborans has no such sense of rendering vision, mounting
pride, building career, or establishment of identity through property .
To the Greeks and to Arendt, the hierarchy is clear between animal laborans that
is slave to the natural conditions of life and homofaber who lords over nature, the self,
and her or his doings38. One distinction that helps us understand the hierarchy is that
unlike both the subsistent animal laborans and the dependent actor - homofaber, as
agent ofher or his own design and products, is free to produce and - facing alone the
work ofher or his own hands - is free to destroy39. Not only can we classify civilizations
based on the tools that survive them, a tool's very survival of a labor process is testament
to the existence of different skill sets within various social classes. The industrial
revolution brings a great simplification of skill sets and the strata ofworkers as they get
split into machinists and managers.
Ibid., p.82.
Property that is physically tamed or intellectually patented.
Arendt, 1958, p. 127.
Ibid., p. 126.
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As we approach modernity and the advent of machines, a disconnection emerges
between the tool and the user. Where a craftsperson used to be connected to the materials
they worked with and the person using the end product, the industrial worker is a tool in
the manufacturing chain who has to work with whatever tools and materials are provided.
Where formerly a person's skill fit within a community of craftspeople and tools, humans
are now machine parts that can be placed and replaced with only a regard to whether they
fit the task needed, but they may not be aware of or consulted about the materials used or
how the next stage of the product being built relates to their work. The factor that disturbs
Arendt is that in a society that uses tools to prepare for consumption, as they lose their
work-character in labor's rhythm of unifying and ordering its instrumental parts, the
importance of intention and the product intended blurs40. Arendt writes, "The very
distinction between means and ends [that characterizes the activities of the craftsperson],
simply does not make sense."41 Where a tradition of weaving work is handed down from
master to assistant, the weaving process has built into it hours ofother skills, such as,
trading for materials (bobbins, dyes, threads, and loom parts); identifying types and
qualities of yarns and dyes; and learning to differentiate between and form other weaves,
like brocade, twill weaves and satin weaves. For thousands of years, carpets and other
textiles were made by weavers sitting together shuttling the weft along the warp of a
loom, all along talking about their work (perhaps even singing), enriching their craft and
their customs, and passing along news and knowledge. With the Industrial Revolution's
'flying shuttle', the need for assistance declined and now with mechanical looms
weaving's skill-set has been replaced with technicians' know-how and rhythmic
40 Ibid., p. 127.
41 Ibid., p. 127.
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traditional quality control checklists for the looms' maintenance and the products'
completion. When tools are used to divide tasks into discrete laborious rudiments and
divide resources into stockpiles of materials and partially constructed parts and pieces,
only the rhythm of the laboring body can unify labor and work processes. In this light, the
advent of machines is logical, but the problem ofmeaning only deeps. Although homo
faber can justify the world for its usefulness, the instrumentality that unites human and
machine holds meaning only for the products and tools created, not for the human.
While only fabrication with its instrumentality is capable ofbuilding a world, this
same world becomes as worthless as the employed material, a mere means for
further ends, if the standards which governed its coming into being are permitted
to rule it after its establishment.
This helps us see the difference between tools and machines and the disconnect and de-
skilling modernity has shuttled across the weave of time.
While a tool is in the hands of a craftsperson controlling its range of work and
quality ofoutput, a machine, in contrast, only requires an attendant to control quantity, to
monitor its fixed output and to feed it more materials. A machine attendant is attuned to a
rhythm of the machine's needs, while tools and materials are attuned to the needs of a
craftsperson. In the larger picture, a machine sits at the center of a consumption chain
needing to be fed materials at a high rate, in a specific proportion and in a shape that
requires the material supplier to also be highly efficient and repetitive. It is easy to argue
that if the product manufactured is too durable and sustainable, the machine's lifetime
would be short, therefore machines are now designed not to make long-lasting goods. To
validate the machine's existence, the distribution side of the product needs an expanding
market of regularly open outlets with regular customers who expect the product's
42Ibid., p. 137.
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eventual obsolescence. The impact on humanity of this development has been felt across
every industry. Even art's 'boundary pushing' crafts that celebrate individual action and
reflection through personalized expression have fallen into cross-promoting industries of
consumer aesthetic fulfillment and marketing. Although I touch on authenticity paradoxes
of the 'art' industries at the end of Chapter 2, it is relevant to say here that the machine
may have added a number ofnew art formats, but, more overwhelmingly, it has flooded
the market with so many duplications of 'art' that art appreciation for its original novelty,
quality, and texture pales in comparison to the collecting and consumption ofcheap
reproductions such as key chains, snow-globes, refrigerator magnets, computer desktops
images, posters, and coffee table books. At least pre-industrial-revolution art
reproductions carried with them the skills of the craft and the connection between
reproducer and client! In modernity, 'art' and décor are manufactured by people without
the skills to understand or appreciate the expression therein. Further, like most factory-
made products, there is no connection between those who make and those who purchase
the reproduction.
We have now seen how Arendt thinks labor and work have blended together in an
unpleasant complex. For now, let us turn from modernity's labor and work overlap in the
public (which is called the social and reviewed in Chapter 2) to return to ancient Greece
where the clarity of separation of labor and work in the private realm allowed for the




By action, Arendt means the expressing oforiginal words and the doing of original deeds
within a communal framework not bound to or related to the necessities of labor or the
market ofwork. This allows for the existence of a public space separate from an
individual's private life, which Arendt calls freedom43', and the struggle within the public
space to exercise freedom is called politics. Freedom, for Arendt, is not needing to attend
to the necessities of life, nor the need to control resources or keep the market place in
order, nor the need to vie for power, as all these detract from freedom to act. With all of
these taken care of in one's own private realm, 'politics' is the engagement of action
between equals in such a founded freedom where inner self-reflection (contemplation)
and distinction drives action. Arendt puts politics in the Ancient Greek perspective:
To belong to the few "equals" (homoioi) meant to be permitted to live among
one's peers; but the public realm itself, the polis, was permeated by a fiercely
agonal spirit, where everybody had constantly to distinguish himself from all
others, to show through unique deeds or achievements that he was the best of all
(aien aristeuein). The public realm, in other words, was reserved for individuality;
it was the only place where men could show who they really and inexchangeably
44
were.
Setting her political narrative in the public realm, the principle motives of
Arendt's actors are plurality and natality. By plurality, Arendt means to imply something
rather different than our conventional sense of the term - she means to highlight the
importance of human beings creating difference. Speech and action are needed to
formulate distinction from equals. Past, present, and future have no meaning except
between beings who can distinguish themselves (their uniqueness) from one another.
Arendt writes, "In man, otherness, which he shares with everything that is, and
43 When considering the lexicon of freedom, 'need' is a synonym of 'poverty'.
44 Arendt, 1958, p.38.
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distinctness, which he shares with everything alive, become uniqueness, and human
plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique beings."4
By natality46 Arendt uses the root natal or 'birth' to invoke the quality action has
to suddenly bring something new and fresh to life. Arendt declares that although inserting
ourselves into the world by word or deed
may be stimulated by the presence of others whose company we may wish to
join... it is never conditioned by them; its impulse springs from the beginning
which came into the world when we were born and to which we respond by
beginning something new on our own initiative. To act, in its most general sense,
means to take an initiative, to begin (as the Greek word archein, 'to begin,' 'to
lead,' and eventually 'to rule," indicates), to set something into motion (which is
the original meaning of the Latin agere).47
Natality is critical to action for a number of reasons. One, with "new beings constantly
born. . . new birth promises new beginnings."48 Two, to see that new action can arrive
unanticipated is to get a sense of unbridled freedom. As Maurizio D 'Entreves (1994)
points out, "to be free means to engage in action, while through action our capacity for
freedom is actualized.49" Three, new actions prevent stagnation and corruption in human
affairs.
Speech, for Arendt, is a critical aspect of action. However, it is also paradoxical
because it can, in its distinct way, distinguish humans in the most revelatory or shocking
manner invoking realization and motivation, and yet also obscure humans in the most
mechanical manner of automatic associations. Speech, Arendt says, "corresponds to the




49 D'Entrèves, Maurizio. The Politicalphilosophy ofHannah Arendt. New York: Routledge, p.67. 1994.
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fact ofdistinctness and is the actualization of the human condition ofplurality." Without
speech, action has no character or subject. In fact, Arendt concludes that action is only
relevant through spoken word where a human identifies the self as actor, announcing
what one does, has done and will do51. Otherwise, action without disclosure of an agent is
only the 'means to an end' and "it is obvious that the same end could be much more
easily attained in mute violence/'52 Silence and passivity's ability to hide the 'who'
someone is, can be a desired anonymity or a terrifying tyranny. And yet, even though the
voice is so critical to represent the self and its actions, when one tries to express 'who'
someone is, Arendt says we cannot help but describe 'what'53 a person is instead. "Our
very vocabulary leads us astray... [getting] entangled in a description of qualities" we
associate and identify in one another resulting in the loss ofprecise human uniqueness .
When a student says, "I am too shy to participate" he or she is using the verb to be, but
there is no clear sense of who he or she is. Rather, there is only a common disconnected
quality of shyness that makes up what the student is. Conversely, to say, "I do not
participate because if I make a mistake others will see that I am not as strong as I act and
I am putting up a facade," tells us more about who the person is.
To labor is to survive; paired with consumption, it is to subsist. When work is
done, the world is made and maintained. However, action and speech are in some sense
more powerful because they form a basis for human individuality, for authenticity. Action
5? Arendt, 1958, p. 158.
51 Ibid., p.158-159.
52IWd., p. 159.
53 Ibid., p. 161. We will see this also echoed by Jaspers, in Kaplan, 1961, p. Ill, at the end of Existence
preceding essence (Ch. 3).
54 Arendt, 1958, p. 161.
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and speech form a narrative, resulting in a story, establishing a history of events in the
world55. Arendt offers strong arguments that the Pre-Socratics understood this
action/work/labor hierarchy and through it conceived of and clarified freedom as residing
in the public, political realm. She further clarifies that the basic action of each citizen for
freedom was a renouncement of individual and or group sovereignty, because
sovereignty's "ideal of uncompromising self-sufficiency and mastership, is contradictory
to plurality."56 To make the publicly political possible, distinction and natality were
always at the fore. This meant that, for Arendt and the Greeks, new things must be tried,
new difficulties endeavoured, and that ease is no measure of success or livelihood.
Pain and effort bound together with necessity is Arendt's definition of what it
feels like to be alive. She comments on the Greek view: "For mortals, the 'easy life of the
gods' would be a lifeless life."57 It does, however, by a 'repugnance to futility' clarify that
freedom is won by being aware ofovercoming necessity, because work and its results
build a sense of liberation58. Contrary to the natural survival mode of the household, the
polis
was the sphere of freedom, and if there was a relationship between these two
spheres, it was a matter of course that the mastering of the necessities of life in the
household was the condition for the freedom of the polis. Under no circumstances
could politics be only a means to protect society... it is freedom of society which
requires and justifies the restraint ofpolitical authority. Freedom is located in the
realm of the social, and force or violence becomes the monopoly of the
government.
What is important to realize presently is how delicate the polis is and how
'freedom' is something shared and maintained through efforts of not selflessness, but
55 Ibid., p.85.
56Ibid.,p.210.




'self- full-ness'. Freedom is not simply the chance to be released from the labor and work
required to maintain one's household. Further, freedom is not earned by being the master
of necessities. The freedom we are talking about here is not merely having rights; it must
be disambiguated from capricious rights and sovereign claim. In Chapter 2, it will be
even more relevant how aware the Greeks (and Arendt) are of action on freedom's
context and paradox.
A critical aspect of action is the degree ofuncertainty involved. No one can be
completely sure what will actually happen next, and no one can change what has
happened. History shows that the claim of success or failure of any particular deed or
action is tentative; what may be a short-term success may prove to be a long-term blunder,
or what seems a short-term disaster may be a long-term saving grace. And while the
multiplication ofoutput ofwork and labor are limited by physical materials, the
consequences of action can multiply into results unbridled, a seemingly endless fractal of
spin-offs known and unknown. The fact that a human can put in process "a single deed
[that] can quite literally endure throughout time until mankind itself has come to an
end. . . could be a matter ofpride if men were able to bear its burden, the burden of
irreversibility and unpredictability, from which the action process draws its very
strength."60 Action is thus a tremulous road of experimentation and flying by the seat of
one's pants, with much less predictable results than labor or work.
The sheer fact that only a historian can put together what happened in hindsight,
is reason enough to turn away with despair from the realm ofhuman affairs and to hold
contempt the human capacity for freedom, which by producing the web ofhuman
relationships, seems to entangle its producer to such an extent that he appears much more
60 Ibid., p.209.
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the victim and the sufferer than the author and doer of what he has done. Nowhere, in
other words, neither in labor, subject to the necessity of life, nor in fabrication, dependent
on given material, does man appear to be less free than in those capacities whose very
essence is freedom and in that realm which owes its existence to nobody and nothing but
man.61
The "radical novelty of [Arendt's] view" according to Dossa, is that "the ability to
exercise sovereignty does not mean the absence of freedom. On the contrary: 'if men
wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they must renounce.'" Therefore, the tyranny
that results from sovereignty in the public realm, not only defines its costs as human
plurality, freedom, action and politics63, it clarifies the fragility of authenticity.
As we have seen the vita activa is made of three distinct human conditions: labor,
work, and action. Labor is what we do to survive, how we maintain feeding and cleaning
up after ourselves. Work is what we do to make survival easier and more efficient. It is
how we have made the world, through tools and organizing (by splitting up tasks). Action
is the freedom to express the distinct self through deed or speech with no necessity to the
maintenance of labor nor obligation to the marketplace ofwork nor need to control or
seek power.
Arendt's hypothesis is that the Pre-Socratics had recognized that to balance the
vita activa with regular periods of reflection - a co-existing way to live called the vita
contemplativa - was a project towards living authentically that kept labor and work in the
private realm and action in the public realm. In their private households Greek citizens
61 Ibid., p.210.
62 Dossa, 1989, p.85. With a quote from Arendt's On Revolution, 1965, p.152.
63 Ibid.. p.85.
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may have had slaves, but that is not at issue and further they would not have denied that
slaves in the private realm gave them the opportunity to develop this public political
realm where action took shape and grew. Although it is quite dubious Arendt would claim
it was perfectly authentic, this period before the Greco -Roman empires, showed that
these great new (natal) strivings for public distinction without vying for power
(sovereignty) displayed an intention for the authentic by making a demarcation of what
was inauthentic .
By the clear separation of the private and public realms, and the power of
reflection intertwined with labor, work and action, Arendt identifies a project worth
reviewing that leaves no doubt that contemplation is obligatory to recover from
modernity and consumer society^- Chapter two will outline how set back we are from this
reform due to the multi-layered collapse of the public realm, the devaluation of action
that has brought about the stampeding evolution of society (the social realm) bound by
devout superstitious morality policies imbedded in our political and curriculum
philosophies.
The next chapter explores the challenges faced by the delicate relationship
between authenticity and the human condition. As work and labor migrate from the
private to the public, the resulting social realm redefines action and freedom; glorifies
labor; multiplies conformity; and juxtaposes the vita activa and the vita contemplativa.
No small threat to authenticity and action, the complexity of these circumstances unfold,
migrate and reinforce themselves for 2400 years.
64 Although there were various orators and military commanders who tried to take control ofAthens or
Greece from the 7lh to 5,h Centuries B.C.E., it became clear that in the project of the Greek Republic this
was not acceptable.
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Chapter 2 - Hierarchical shifts in the human condition and the formation
ofthesocialrealm
The emergence of society- the rise ofhousekeeping, its activities, problems and
organizational devices - from the shadowy interior of the household into the light
of the public sphere, has not only blurred the old border line between private and
political, it has also changed almost beyond recognition the meaning of the two
terms and their significance for the life of the individual and the citizen. '
This chapter describes the rise and reinforcement of the conformist, coercive aspects of
society- what Arendt calls the social66 - through three historical periods: the fall of the
Greek Republic, the establishment of the Roman Catholic Empire, and the lapse into
consumer capitalism: modernity's failed attempt to produce an industrial utopia. The
common denominator of these three periods is the steady rise of the the social, a realm
where, as Arendt points out, action has not been placed below labor and work as much as
labor and work have been raised above action. This is the sociopolitical economy we
identify as our society today.
To introduce the longer narrative of this chapter, I will briefly outline the story of
the rise of the social that I intend to explore at greater length. According to Arendt, the
social originally emerged by the fall ofthe Ancient Greek public realm and subsequent
collapse of the private realms in the Greek and Roman Empires. Ancient historian
anthropologist Thucydides67 (411 B.C.E., 1993) helps to contextualize the fracture
between Greek Republic and the Greek Empire. Through Plato's (360 B.C.E.) "allegory
65 Arendt, 1958, p.35.
66 Ibid., p.35-65. We could parallel the social to Nietzsche's herd, those assimilated in Western Judeo-
Christian morality, and Heidegger's the they who he uses to distinguish between the dominant way of
thinking: "the They-self' and the "authentic-self, the self which has explicitly grasped itself. Heidegger,
Martin. Being & Time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, p. 121,
1962.
67 Thucydides. On Justice, power and human nature: Selections from The Histoiy ofthe Peloponnesian War,
P. Woodruff (Ed. & Trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 411 B.C.E., 1993.
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of the cave" in his dialogue The Republic , we get a quite shocking blueprint of the
Platonic plan for future "founders of the state" that reserved the vita contemplativa solely
for philosophers. Thus was initiated the suppression ofaction and plurality by a morality
scheme that would replace 'fear of the Gods' with the more rewarding 'doing good'.
By the 4th Century A.D., to relieve itselfof the cumbersome influx of craftspeople
and laborers into a swelling social-economy and to reconcile the open opposition of
Christian martyrdom plaguing its leadership, the Roman Empire adapted Christianity to
govern the social. Since then, generations have compromised the most important aspects
of living by converting their active and contemplative lives into merely useful existences.
Firstly, they traded civic space, that any tax payer would have full access to, for limited
access to private 'holy' space at a cost of faith, donation and charity. They also traded the
direct experience of 'the eternal'69 through individual and communal philosophical
explorations ofpublic distinction and excellence for the promise of salvation in an
unknown 'afterlife' whose entrance was externally regulated by edicts demanding
humility and no questions asked.
Where the Greeks believed in no afterlife, Christians were led to believe there
were a number of them70, the most worrisome of which are 'heaven' and 'hell'. As we
will see, through manipulation of shame and 'doing good', philosophers (a miniscule
fraction of the population) promised heaven to the mass majority in exchange for a life-
long labor and work-intensive servitude to humbly build the 'eternity of mankind'. There
is, perhaps, no finer example of the demand on humanity for compromise and humility
68 Plato, The Republic, (Benjamin Jowett, Trans.), taken from:
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic8.vii.html, book VII, 360 B.C.E..
69 'The eternal' is the Pre-Socratic concept Arendt uses to indicate universal connection, spirituality or
ascension of the soul.
70 This thesis assumes that with no proof of an afterlife there therefore is not one.
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made by philosophers than Ecclesiastes 3, which I have included in its entirety in two
versions as Appendix Ia (New International Bible) and Ib (King James) at the end of this
document. Here, below is the core of Ecclesiastes 3:9-13:
9 What does the worker gain from his toil? 10 I have seen the burden God has laid
on men. " He has made everything beautiful in its time. He has also set eternity in
the hearts of men; yet they cannot fathom what God has done from beginning to
end. I2 1 know that there is nothing better for men than to be happy and do good
while they live. 13 That everyone may eat and drink, and find satisfaction in all his
toil—this is the gift of God.
Trading their capacity for philosophy, action, and freedom in this life, for the promise of
paradise in the next life ('heaven'), humans - whose forefathers and mothers worked to
free themselves from necessity to participate in a public political realm - now settled for
the crumbs, called 'grace', that fell from the exalted philosophers' table merely "being
happy" and "doing good while they live," which meant following the prescribed rules of
the church. Regular citizens were reminded by the priests - the only ones allowed to
practice philosophy - that if faith in their wrathful 'God' faltered, so too would 'His'
clemency and they would burn in that other afterlife: 'hell'.
In the 19th Century, Marx's attempt to redeem the debased worker and shift power
away from the philosopher, Arendt argues, was well intentioned, but resulted in a
glorification ofwork and labor at the renunciation of action. Arendt shows that with
Christian morality so entrenched in Western existence and action completely
compromised in the social, instead of the new opportunities for contemplation promised
by surplus, only mass-consumerism has ensued.
In the following three sections, I will outline the fall of action in three historical
contexts starting in Ancient Greece, continuing in the Roman Empire's formation of the
71 New International Bible, Ecclesiastes 3:9-12.
23
Christian institution, and, finally, modern humanity's disconnect in pre-totalitarian
consumerism.
The original Ancient Athenian public realm and the corruption ofaction
To the Greeks, the need for elite citizens to wield power in the private realm to maintain
their estates was not freedom. Paradoxical to our modern way of thinking, Greek freedom
only existed in the public realm where power was relinquished. The need to create order,
to clarify caste or class by wealth, power, or bureaucracy, and to manage private issues
was not welcome. Conversely, in modernity, these issues are the political focus of modern
central government. To the Greeks, politics meant something else entirely.
In its heyday of the Seventh to Fifth Century B.C.E.72, the Athenian public realm
was like a localized community "lake" formed by the streams of deeds poured into it, and,
by definition, unrelated to work and labor that formed the contours ofthe adjoining yet
separate private realm. If, for each public citizen, there was a private mountain estate and
a river valley carved by the private work and labor of each estate, in the basin far below
was the lake: a collection of all the in-running streams from each citizen's river valley,
the pure pool of the public realm composed solely of speeches and actions. These were
not speeches of necessity about how to fend off attackers, how to make harvests more
efficient, how to keep slaves from escaping, or how to establish better trade logistics.
These were speeches and inquiries, referred to as dialectics, about philosophical ideas.
These philosophers asked question like "What is being?", "What is real and what seems
to be real?" "What is the world and all things in it made of?" "Why are we here?" "What
72 This era, called Presocratic by Catherine Osborne in Presocratic Philosophy: A Veiy Short Introduction,
Oxford University Press, 2004, is at least what we have in written form or evidence ofby written references
by others later through Sixth Century A.D.
24
is truth?" "What is observable and what is not?" "Is speech more or less powerful than
the written word?" or "What is the soul and how is it formed?" Made publicly in the polis,
these political dialogues were expanded upon, debated and made rich by the various
interpretations and efforts to bring forth something new (what Arendt calls the natal) that
was yet unspoken or unconsidered (contemplation) that would bring inspiration. This
inspiration felt individually was akin to immortality or a momentary elation that left
mortality behind. This spirit, felt as a community, brought the momentary sense of
freedom, which they in turn tried to nurture. In no way automatic, the authentic sensation
of freedom required new and plural exploration and inspiration, and therefore could not
be attained mechanically.
In this flourishing Greek 'republic', virtually every citizen was a philosopher. We
know the most popular ones because their words - their excellence and distinction - were
spoken repeatedly and then written down. The pre-Socratic philosophers demanded
nobility through striving for individual immortality as a means of 'making society better'.
The greater the public action or deed, the higher the bar was raised among those who
strived for freedom keeping work and labor of the private separated from the public.
Embracing this way of life was to set up the connection between the vita contemplativa
and the three different conditions of the vita activa. Having an open reflection of life's
conditions was to put in front of one's self the reality of public and private life and the
conflict between having to maintain control, order and power in the private and having to
let go of sovereignty in the public. In contrast to one's active life's conditioning,
contemplation as a constant and refreshing resource, we can argue, is the heart of the
authenticating the self.
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This attempt at authentic living did not promise ease, but rather challenged the
individual to emphasize his or her noble and communal self at the expense of the power
the individual could amass by manipulating others or the system for personal gain. The
resulting honor was felt and expressed as the peak of the human soul. In a profound
exchange about the difference between speech as action versus the written word as a
diluted expression and lesser craft, Socrates explains to a young Phaedrus that
no body which is moved from outside itself has a soul, while everybody which is
moved from within itself, from its own resources, has a soul, since this is what it
is to be soul.73
Establishing a universal striving to perfect the soul became a personal and
communal endeavor know as distinction1A . Most importantly, however, regardless of any
postulation of recurring or multiple lives75, the soul could be developed in the current life,
and sensation of the eternal could be attained in this life and individually for deeds done
and honorable words spoken.
To belong to the few "equals" (homoioi) meant to be permitted to live among
one's peers; but the public realm itself, the polis, was permeated by a fiercely
agonal spirit, where everybody had constantly to distinguish himself from all
others, to show through unique deeds or achievements that he was the best of all
{aien aristeuein). The public realm, in other words, was reserved for
individuality.76
This was a rich and open period of innovation where many traditional and
conservative ideas were challenged, especially in satirical plays. The Sophists were
traveling teachers who spread The New Learning77, an intellectual and artistic revolution
73 Plato. Phaedrus. (R. Waterfield, Trans.). Toronto: Oxford University Press, circa 360 B.C.E., 2002, 245e.
74 Arendt, 1958, p. 19.
75 See Plato's Phaedrus.
76 Arendt, 1958, p.38. We can still see traces of this concept in the Olympics.
77 Woodruff, 1993, p.xv; Paul Woodruff. "Plato's Shorter Ethical Works", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, URL = < http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-ethics-shorter/>, section 11, 2005.
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embraced by Pericles (the then "most effective leader of the [Athenian] democracy" )
that shocked conservatives (including Plato) and most Greeks living outside ofAthens. In
fact, Sophists were prohibited in Lacedaemonia79 (where Sparta is the capital), because it
was so blasphemous to their tradition of Gods and morality and it brought unwanted
inquiries into superstition and traditions.
By the 5th Century B.C.E, as illustrated in great detail by Thucydides80, as the
Peloponnesian War with Sparta became highly charged, a new set of necessities for the
ruling (citizen) class encroached on Athens. Although Athenians formed the Delian
League in 477, a fund forfuture combat with the Persians, by 454, Pericles had removed
the Delian League Treasury and put it in Athens. This action, according to Horst Hutter
(2008), "was a-formation of the [Greek] empire as the fund was used to pay the stipends
of the Athenian assemblymen - who of course voted for Pericles." The concept of
freedom and plurality began to slide from the public sphere when the need to exert
control or determine a hierarchy among equals re-emerged. In the setting that had
previously been nurturing the polis and the freedom to speak one's mind through dialectic,
rhetoric was now being employed to sway the assembly, and through it, "some men rose
to power without winning elected office."
As the Peloponnesian crisis started escalating (about 22 years after the republic
had become an empire - according to Hutter) due to broken treaties of Greek states, trade
embargos and border skirmishes, Corinth invited Sparta to a debate in 432 in which they
78 Ibid., p.xv.
79 Plato. Hippias Major, 283-284; in Thucydides, 1993, p.28 [footnote 78 by Woodruff).
80 Thucydides. On Justice, power and human nature: Selections from The Histoiy ofthe Peloponnesian War,
P. Woodruff (Ed. & Trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1993.
81 Horst Hutter. Lecture series: A Swvey ofthe major Greek thinkers that have shaped the political
conceptions ofour culture from POLI206: Introduction to Western Political Theory. Recorded at Concordia
University, Montreal, February 14, 2008.
82 Woodruff, 1993, p.xiii.
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hoped to convince Sparta to join them in war against Athens. In the opening of the debate,
the Corinthians described the differences between Sparta and Athens and railed at Sparta
in an effort to provoke them. What is important to this thesis is that the excerpts below
explicitly show action has been corrupted in Athens by rhetoric where the vita
contemplativa (rest and leisure as designated time for reflection) is no longer practiced to
balance the vita activa:
". . .we think you [Sparta] are blind. We don't think you have thought through
what sort ofpeople these Athenians are: your struggle will be with people totally
different from yourselves. They love innovation, and are quick to invent a plan
and then to carry it out in action, while you are good only for keeping things as
they are, and you never invent anything or even go as far as necessary in
action. ...Above all, they never hesitate; you are always delaying; they are never
at home, and you are the worst homebodies, because they count on getting
something by going abroad, while you fear you will lose what you have if you go
out. . . .You see, they alone get what they hope for as soon as they think of it,
through the speed with which they execute their plans. At this they toil, filling all
the days of their lives with hard work and danger. What they have, they have no
leisure to enjoy, because they are continually getting more. They do not consider
any day a holiday unless they have done something that needed to be done; and
they think that an idle rest is as much trouble as hard work. So that, in a word, üjs
true to say that they are born never to allow themselves or anyone else a rest. That
is the character of their city.
Of course, the Spartans eventually win the war, and one factor could be this
corrupted overreaching vita activa and lack of reflection (vita contemplativa) the
Corinthian describes.
As we approach the Romans and Christianity, I would like to introduce the
concept of common. It is that which, tightly knit, made Sparta strong; and which, open to
interpretation and change, made Athens weak; and 600 years later - 1 will argue - that
which, masterfully deployed, unified the Roman Empire under Christianity. As Hutter
(2005) defines it, "the common is a community of persons that are united by common
Thucydides, 1993, pp. 19-20 [70-71], my underline.
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consent to laws and sharing of sacred things." But these laws were not written in Greek
times; they were unwritten rules and norms from a traditional education and training
system. Hutter says that the mechanism that guides a common set of rules is justice
moderated by internalized piety shaped by a common fear of an external threat.
Confronting fear of an external threat as a community is a transformative
experience. Forming tradition around this experience makes it sacred and binding.
Inclusion into the community therefore requires adherence to, and common maintenance
of, the tradition. The justification of the community's rules defines a way of living; it
outlines a philosophy. The choice ofwhether one accepts this traditional way of living
will depend on the dynamic of the tradition's philosophy and its mode of fulfilling justice.
Sparta and Athens had different dynamics, but they both employed-fear of an external
threat to guide justice within their common.
Although all Greeks used the common enemy ofPersia as a way to justify its
fulfillment ofjustice and security maintenance, the Spartans, in addition, used the
suppression of their slaves (the helots) to hone their vigilance. Going to war means
exposing one's self to pain, to suffering and potentially to death. By requiring their
population to be courageous and to overcome their cowardice86, the Spartans established
and maintained a strong and common identity. But to ultimately bind Spartans together -
to make them convinced beyond any doubt that what they did domestically and at large
84 Hutter, 2005, Feb 3rd lecture.
85 In his Feb 3rd 2005 lecture Hutter summarizes the rules ofjustice as presented by Thucydides: In a
conflict you must not go to a violent solution, you must seek a peaceful compromise. Ifyou make a
contract with someone you must obey the contract. If there is punishment, it must meet the crime and only
against the guilty. You must always seek compromise, rather than violence. Tyranny must be avoided.
86Ibid., Feb 3rd lecture.
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was justified - it took not just rules, but shared superstition. Of the Spartans, Hutter
87called this a "divine sanction attached to the rules."
Through constant warfare, civilizations establish strong commons, and "those
who do not reach a common defense are swept under."88 While general security is
sustained in the common by making a common defense against an outside enemy or
threat, what if the threat is less imminent and there are no slaves to keep you on edge? We
can argue that this was the case of the Ancient Athenian Republic that gave it the
opportunity to develop the polis and relinquish external fears, ofwhich the New Learning
was arguably the result. Of course, it did not last, because external forces reappeared and
action was corrupted, but we do have this historical problem of the social that Arendt
beseeches we investigate. With inauthenticity under investigation, I believe there is
insight in considering what brought down mighty Athens. We have argued it was in part
their own tyrannical arrogance, but what caused Sparta to win? Athens was Godless.
Sparta believed in Gods and were (w)holy superstitious. There is only one thing more
powerful than allowing superstition to reign in the self or in the community: superstitious
tradition.
Superstitious tradition helps galvanize a common through another level of fear.
Rules not being enough, the Spartans traditionally, and the Athenians in their own new
way of wielding persuasion and rhetoric89, used shame to manage fear and temper
civilians. Hutter asserts that even shame alone does not work if there is nothing sacred
attached to it; thus, aidos, the fear of the opinion of the Gods, is used to keep people in
common order. Although I may make an argument against expressing my passion through
87Ibid., Feb 3rd lecture.
88IWd., Feb 3rd lecture.
89 Among other ancient and modern civilizations.
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violence to avoid shame via aischune, the fear of opinion of others, "even if my neighbor
is not present, the Gods will observe me." This is the key, because common order
requires that everyone believes in the Gods. With the same common for more than 400
years, "shaped from a similar habitus of the mind and habitus of the soul," the Spartans'
success continuously reinforced their belief in the Gods. They thought that the Gods were
on their side and through their superstition they kept order amongst themselves and
justified their actions.
This helps to make a stark contrast to the Athenian common that had abandoned
Gods.
The Athenian public realm was expanding with a surge of new citizens from the
private realm. Athens was changing and the dynamic of satires, free speech and pushing
for distinction allowed for and even caused society to form. The people who occupied
public space were not just subjects to it, they were a part of it. The New Learning had had
its effect and citizenship had opened now to any man who claimed Athenian descent. On
the inside, Athens saw great change, growth and a new sense of common, where "day-
laborers, with no landed estates at all, could pass judgment on the richest men of the
city."92 But externally the other Greek states were reticent to embrace this innovation.
Empowering as it may have been for Athens, with neighboring hostility flaring externally
and dialectic shifting to rhetoric and persuasion internally, new arguments began
circulating in Athens about future "Founders of the State."
w Hutter, 2005, Feb 3rd lecture.
91 Ibid., Feb 3rd lecture.
92 Woodruff, 1993, p.xiv.
93 Plato, 360 B.C.E., book VII.
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With freedom compromised by the need to form order, action degenerated to
governance and power issues and an oligarchic power struggle replaced public politics.
Here is where the hole left from abandoning 'fear of Gods' began to be filled by the
necessity of 'doing good', and where the vita contemplativa was removed from the public
sphere and taken over by the philosophers. As was mentioned in the introduction of this
chapter, the practical concrete doctrine that sets philosophers up as the elite is
Ecclesiastes - a book of the original Hebrew Bible (that is now part of the Old Testament
portion of the Christian Bible), roughly translated as 'gathering' or more modernly
'church', that dates back to approximately 180 B.C. E. This forlorn document admonishes
humans to accept their lives as fiatile and thus be satisfied with their lot in life as laborers.
But this attitude and how it was to be achieved was set up by Athenian predecessors.
It is most famously exemplified in Plato's allegory of the cave from the
Republic95, which I will lay out here, as it is key to understanding Arendt's observations
in the section "The Traditional substitution of making for acting,"96 in The Human
Condition's chapter on Action. Plato (through Socrates) describes a cave beneath the
surface of the earth where people are chained together and their heads are fixed to face
the back wall where shadows are cast from the fire behind and above them. Between the
chained and the fire is a low wall upon which objects can be set and manipulated to
94 Plato (through Socrates and Glaucon) lays out this allegory in book VII (5 14a-520a) which is part of
section 2 (books VI-VII) of The Republic where he characterizes the philosopher.
95 The Pre-Socratic Greek Republic, during which many tyrants took or tried to take power, characterized
by the mid Archaic Period (7th Century B.C.E.) to just prior to the absorption of the Delian League Treasury
into Athens (454 B.C. E.), should not be confused with the republic described in Plato's The Republic.
Plato's is the blue print for many concepts established within succeeding Western republics, but Arendt asks
us to look again at the original historical Greek Republic for more profound inspiration and evidence of a
project approaching freedom, contemplation and action.
96 Arendt, 1958, (section 31) pp. 197-206.
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intentionally cast shadows. Reality, as far as the chained are concerned, is the shadows
and echoes off the back wall.
When one of the chained is freed, Socrates and Glaucon agree that when shown
the shadow producing objects and mechanism of illusion, the prisoner would be
perplexed finding "the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which
are now shown to him."97 Not until he is brought up into the light of the sun, moon and
stars, and sees his own reflection in the water, would the prisoner actually see himself as
he actually is in his own proper place and not in another (the manipulated prison). Only
then will he "contemplate himself as he is" and achieve the knowledge of the
philosopher98. Meanwhile, those in the cave will have their own conception ofjustice,
wealth and power, but in virtue of the fact that they are shadow followers, they will be
ignorant, poor in wisdom and virtue, and hungry for private advantage.
With the oligarchy that proceeded the Athenian Republic, this philosophy devised
by Plato (and subsequently reinforced by Aristotle) substantiated abstract 'form', lifting
objective 'ideas' above what senses perceive. Arendt comments:
This transformation was necessary to apply the doctrine of ideas to politics, and it
is essentially for a political purpose, the purpose of eliminating the character of
frailty from human affairs, that Plato found it necessary to declare the good, and
not the beautiful, to be the highest idea. But this idea of the good is not the highest
idea ofthe philosopher99.
What is 'beautiful' guides the philosopher who has left the cave to gaze in wonder
at the stars. When rules for civil order are needed - then it is the 'good' which guides the
philosopher-king. Yet what ultimately transformed fear of the Gods into a common
framework of morality, or "doing good," is the striving of the philosopher, now




philosopher-king, to enforce "his" interpretation of what is good on others. As we will see
in his conception of "Founders of the state," the philosopher king comes from a class of
legislators who are given partial access to contemplation - enough to "pity" those still
prisoners in the cave - but are then thrust back into the prison to maintain order and build
the world. What is so shocking, as we will see in the next section, is that this compromise
- made ecclesiastic - is exactly what the original revolution of Jesus Christ sought to
overthrow1 '.
Although the educational plan in Plato's "Republic"™2 offers every Greek an
education, it does so 'essentially' based on capacities and competencies that define who
one is separating people into a pyramid of laborers, guardians, crafts people, philosophers,
legislators with the best among them as a philosopher-king at the top. Plato writes that the
philosophers should hold "citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them
benefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors ofone another; to this end he [the
legislator] created them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up
the State."103
The judgment of others therefore causes one to act in a very specified way, which
is really not genuinely acting at all - it is, rather, maintaining and upholding the world,
which is by its very essence not action, but rather a form of labor or work. That makes
doing good (or, in other words, following prescribed morality), immediately problematic
for authentic living and personal growth which is not devoid ofpangs, disruption,
imbalance and pain, but requires contemplation, self-actualization through plurality and
100 Plato, 360 B.C.E., The Republic, book VII.
101 For more insight (or blasphemy), please see Appendix HI: My Theoiy on the life ofJesus.
102 Socrates and Glaucon refer to themselves, and others like themselves, to be the "founders of the State"
in Plato, 360 B.C.E., The Republic, book VII.
103 Plato, 360 B.C.E., The Republic, book VII.
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natality. Outside the cave prison, the philosopher gets to contemplate, but the legislator,
guardian, craftsperson and laborer living out their lives programmed to the reality of
shadows and echoes do not. They get to maintain and administer 'goodness' for the State,
which now represents a status quo situation where the polis of individual freedom,
philosophy, distinction, and excellence are compromised. Let us go now to see what
philosophers did after hijacking the vita contemplativa.
Christianity! The further decline ofaction and reinforcement of the
social
With the expansion of the Roman Empire and the private realm emptying into the public
realm came the legacy ofWestern consciousness; new and developing technologies; and a
robust public infrastructure . Rome was an enormous empire split into East and West
governed by hereditary senatorial and equestrian aristocrats. Their highly organized
system ofpublic office called cursus honorum (Latin for "course of honours") fulfilled a
centralized need to control and tax labor and work and to limit individual power, speech
and action. Rank elections were so fierce that legislators had to constantly maintain their
perfect records of service to the imperium or risk shame and removal from the status
ladder. Furthermore, they were so occupied with maintaining order and everyone doing
what Roman law required that there was no place for dissension. Tolerated by the
Romans as long as they supported Rome, the philosophers were now either hermits,
tutors, advisors, or students in remote schools.
Arendt writes, "With the disappearance of the ancient city-state, the term vita
activa lost its specifically political meaning and denoted all kinds of active engagement
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in the things of this world."104 It is not that labor and work were lifted up to be the equals
of action, but rather the reduction of action to "among the necessities of earthly life, so
that contemplation (the bios theoretikos, translated into the vita contemplativa) was left as
the only truly free way of life."'05 Yet as contemplation disappeared with the old public
realm, the new social realm became a co-mingled labor and market society ruled by an
empire. Based on Aristotle's conception of the bios politikos, the necessity to rule over
subjects implied an inability to be free, an inability to be political, and a certain level of
commitment to the 'despot's way of life'106. Thus, only the philosopher was free and, as a
non-legislator, he did not even have to fulfill the necessity of maintaining control of
others.
The transitional period from 400 B.G.E. to 300 A.D. is of course a volatile period
in religious history. It is important to outline some basic historical events, within which I
will sketch a few key figures and instances important to the historical narrative in
Appendix II: Historical Timeline 509 B. CE. to 325 A.D.
There is a close connection between ancient philosophers and the conventional
morality that was later promulgated by Christian philosophers. According to Pierre Hadot
(1995), in Seelenführung. Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike, Paul Rabbow (1954)
outlines how "the methods of meditation set forth and practiced in Ignatius of Loyola's
Exercitia spiritualia were deeply rooted in the spiritual exercises of ancient philosophy."
104 Arendt, 1958, p. 15.
105 Ibid., p. 15.
106 Ibid., pp. 14-1 5.
107 The events and persons in Christian history are of course up for interpretation. What is important to me
is that we have a realistic narrative - one that has observed some contemplation on our parts - not just
simply a biblical read, or worse a verbal transmission from an assimilated, blindly faithful Christian.
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108 The spiritual exercises that passed through Christian tradition (to Ignatius ofLoyola in
1522) were very nearly the same as those '"inward orientations' (Innenwendungy
developed by the Stoics and Epicurean schools of the third century B.CE. the
phenomenon of which Hadot confirms we can also detect in "Socratic/Platonic dialogues,
and it continues right up until the end of antiquity. The reason for this is that it is linked to
the very essence of ancient philosophy. It is philosophy itselfthat the ancients thought of
as a spiritual exercise."1 10 And Hadot insists that this is no mere speculation; he says that
Rabbow links it directly to philosophers ancient "predominance to ethical questions in
their instruction""1! The following is critical evidence of the direct intention to
compromise the vita contemplativa:
In fact, Rabbow goes as far as to define spiritual exercises as moral exercises:
[Hadot now citing Rabbow:]
"By 'moral exercises,' we mean a procedure or determinate act, intended
to influence oneself, carried out with the express goal of achieving a
determinate moral effect. It always looks beyond itself, in as much as it
repeats itself, or at least is linked together with other acts to form a
methodical ensemble."
With the advent of Christianity, Rabbow continues, these moral exercises were
transformed into spiritual exercises:
"Spiritual exercises, then which resemble moral exercises like a twin, both
in essence and structure, were raised to their classical rigor and perfection
in the Exerctia Spiritulia of Ignatius of Loyola. Spiritual exercises thus
belong properly to the religious sphere, since their goal is to fortify,
maintain, and renew life 'in the Spirit,' the vita spiritualise
108 Pierre, Hadot. Philosophy as a way oflife (M. Chase, Trans.). Cornwall, UK: Blackwell Publishing,
1995. Paul Rabbow Seelenführung. Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike. Munich, 1954. Ignatius of
Loyola is referenced by Hadot (as ifhe had read the original) but M. Chase provides his own explanation
(which is worth copying here verbatim), in Hadot, p. 109, #4: "[Ignatius of Loyola (ca. 1491-1556), founder
of the Jesuit Order, wrote his handbook entitled Spiritual Exercises beginning in 1522. The goal of the
work was to purify the reader from sin and lead him to God, via a four-stage meditation: beginning with
meditation on sin, the reader progresses to considering the kingom of Christ, the passion, and finally the
risen and glorified Lord. -Trans.]"
109 Rabbow, 1954, p. 17, in Hadot, 1995, p.126.
110 Hadot, 1995, p.126.
111 Ibid., pp. 126-127.
112 Rabbow, 1954, p. 18, in Hadot, 1995, p. 127.
"5Ibid.
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Thus, these exercises are not simply significant just because they have a new
Christian character, "they have as their goal the transformation of our vision of the world,
and the metamorphosis of our being. ...not merely a moral, but also an existential
value... not just... a code of good moral conduct, but a way ofbeing, in the strongest
sense of the term."1 14 But while this may seem exciting to Christians and other
'spiritually traditional' folk, we should reflect carefully on what this is saying. Recall that
there was already a transformation intended by philosophers, or as Plato called them, the
"Founders of the future." Where for the Ancient Greeks taking action with no intention
for power resulted in a kind of excellent and distinct 'noble altruism' on the outside and a
satisfying connection with the eternal on the inside, for the Roman Catholics excellence
and distinction and eternity took on new meanings. The only eternity humankind could
celebrate was in Jesus Christ and only by debasing itself, by satisfying itselfwith toil and
by abandoning a search for meaning in life:
9 What does the worker gain from his toil? 10 I have seen the burden God has laid
on men. " He has made everything beautiful in its time. He has also set eternity in
the hearts ofmen; yet they cannot fathom what God has done from beginning to
end. n I know that there is nothing better for men than to be happy and do good
while they live. u That everyone may eat and drink, and find satisfaction in all his
toil—this is the gift of God. ,4 I know that everything God does will endure
forever; nothing can be added to it and nothing taken from it. God does it so that
men will revere him. p 5
As for men, God tests them so that they may see that they are like the animals.
Man's fate is like that of the animals; the same fate awaits them both: As one dies,
so dies the other. All have the same breath; man has no advantage over the animal.
Everything is meaningless. 20 All go to the same place; all come from dust, and to
dust all return. 2I Who knows if the spirit of man rises upward and if the spirit of
the animal goes down into the earth?
1,4 Hadot, 1995, p. 127.
115 New International Bible, Ecclesiastes 3:9-14.
116 Ibid., Ecclesiastes 3:18-21.
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Reduced to the bleakness of animal laborans and homo faber (at best), excellence was
only rewarded for recognition of doing good through labor and work. Think of the
disgrace this suggests: what was previously private (laboring to survive, eat and clean) is
now all that is left of the former glorious public realm of action—the public is now about
judging and organizing labor.
Considering the formation of children in such a philosophy: one grows up to do
good and be on best behaviour, to 'walk in the light' - a space (exterior to the self) where
one curries favor for appearing good. Is this not a way to construct one's self that
prequalifies the values of one's deeds by a learned disregard for the self? Does one not
become a 'citizen' among the followers multiplying the righteousness of higher
contemplation managed by an external order ofphilosophers/bishops? Meanwhile
potential personal and communal plurality and natality is snuffed out for generations
upon generations. A child learns to subjugate inner validation and the self to external
validation and praise (this is referred to as the divided selfor dividualism by Nietzsche
and Hutter). Further, one could entirely give over one's self to be embraced by a life of
contemplation whose sole purpose is to be the interface between flawed humanity and the
eternal order. I can only conclude that those who were particularly talented or dedicated
to subjugating the whole of their selves were ordained as ministers of behaviour control
and propagation.
Once Christianity took hold, it was not just a devotional tradition; it began to alter
the 'political' realm as a guiding force in the 'public' (social) realm, because it stood for
'freedom' from tainted mankind (Original sin'). The Romans adapted and sponsored the
' '7 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Human, All too Human: A Bookforfree spirits (2nd Ed.) (R.J. Hollingdale, Trans).
Cambridge University Press, 1 996, 1.57. Also see Hutter, Horst. Shaping the future: Nietzsche s new regime
ofthe soul and its ascetic practices. Toronto: Lexington Books, 2006, p.22-23.
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Christian doctrine to cleanse themselves of a terribly messy history (presently recovering
from the Crisis ofthe Third Century), get a fresh start, and combine the fulfillment of the
Empire's necessities, the need to maintain order, and the need to gain the loyalty of an
enormous population. Roman Catholicism's shift from patron deities to patron saints,
creation of a Christian calendar, and recognition of a New Testament Bible as public code
began a revolution ofhuman behavior in the West. Constantine charged Platonic
Christian philosophers (Council ofNicaea 325AD) to organize and lead the Roman
public. To send a clear signal that its jurisdiction was behavioral, Roman Catholicism
immediately launched the first inter-Christian persecutions of the Arians and Donatists.
Why was this mandate important?
If an 'order' ofhumans is charged with the necessity to centralize and claim
speech and action for themselves and hedge labor and work into the same goal, the
promotion of a one-and-only merciful God who 'created man in his image', is a
chauvinistic, yet brilliant, doctrine. Not only would such a doctrine promote (if not ensure)
male dominance, but if representatives of such an order promised to oversee the task of
guiding the population to conduct themselves in God's image, they could endow
themselves with rights of interpretation and judgment of character by declaring their faith
in such a God. In so doing, the Roman Catholic clergy claimed their own benevolence as
a reflection of God's and their own sacrifice as a reflection of Jesus'. The more
theatrically they conduct their traditions of guarding knowledge - driving the vita
contemplativa into esotericism - the more ignorant the population became and the more
superstition aided the clergy in seeding fear, forming the new common, and thus
fabricating a mechanism to maintain justice based on a branded Roman Catholic morality.
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When it suited this tyranny, calling the results of negativity, tragedy and hardship 'God's
wrath' was a return to classic manipulation of shaping the future.
Without a clear pattern ofbehaviour and policy for its subjects to follow, such an
order would not have thrived. Where the laborer and craftsperson were originally under
the private charge of the house master, with the dawn of such an external public 'order',
even a lord would be prudent to take the council of a clergy member. Through
superstition or the superstitious public, one could be made to think twice about his or
her life of action. One could be made to relinquish actions and speeches that one's
ancestors had cultivated as inwardly motivated and self-authenticated. Here, reverting to
the guidance of the pious, one's distinction and honor, in the ancient Greek Republic
sense, is sacrificed for security and enticed with honor ofpossible entrance into a next
world paradise (a future 'freedom' on credit). A manipulation was needed to keep people
'active' but not contemplative. The clergy needed to figure out how to multiply their
ideals and credit 'good' conforming behavior. The Ecumenical Council used Platonic
Philosophy to do just that.
The opportunity for pious recognition through charity in the 'public' (social)
realm comes in the form ofvolunteer labor hours building shelters, clothing the poor and
feeding the hungry. Yet, the tools in this process are used not to make new tools, but to
prepare for consumption on a cyclical metabolic basis, and are thus labor rather than
craftsmanship. And because recognition for charitable deeds comes by the actual hours
spent volunteering, labor is glorified. If everyone knew how to take care of her or himself,
118 Even if a 'lord' knew that there was a 'higher' manipulation or conspiracy to control the working and
laboring class, he or she would be hard pressed to mount a political offensive against an order of
philosopher lords that were wielding the supernatural and the promise of paradise in the 'afterlife'.
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there would be no opportunity for charity' 19, but knowing how to care for yourself is
being part of the world. Arendt says that charity works perfectly outside the world in "the
structure of communal life modeled on the relationships between the members of a
family because these were known to be non-political and even anti-political." And with
a book a Revelations heralding an end to mankind, Arendt points out,
The bond of charity between people, while it is incapable of founding a public
realm on its own, is quite adequate to the main Christian principle of
worldlessness and is admirably fit to carry a group of essentially worldless people
through the world, a group of saints or a group of criminals, provided only it is
understood that thé world itself is doomed and that every activity in it is
undertaken with the proviso quamdiu mundus durât ("as long as the world
lasts").121
Glorifying the labor process due to our status as sojourners in the "vale of tears"
means stunting the work and action processes of the general public. The implications are
broad and far reaching if we consider the near two thousand years ofWestern
civilization's Christian morality conversion process. Programmed to spread 'the word of
the Lord,' devout and righteous missionaries have ensured themselves entry to the
heavens by bringing about the decline of action and reinforcing the social.
Arendt writes, "The modern age was as intent on excluding political man, that is,
man who acts and speaks" 122 as were the Greco-Roman Empires. Beyond law
enforcement, she says, there was to be no other role ofor discourse for action in modern
government. Although agora originally denoted the Greek place of public assembly, with
the transition of the public to the social realm, it became the name for public market place.
No longer a meeting place for citizens (political actors) but a space for craftspeople to
' 19 This assumes not to include the physically challenged or terminally ill - who themselves are not such a
large population that care for them would not need to be a manifesto of a religion.
120 Arendt, 1958, p.49.
121 Ibid., p.49.
122 Ibid., p. 140.
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exchange products, "it was the ever-frustrating ambition of all tyrants to discourage the
citizens from worrying about public affairs, from idling their time away in unproductive
agoreuein and politeuesthai."U3 Certainly, Roman Catholicism 'fixed' that problem for
quite a long time.
The Fallout of society and Marx's flawed vision to reconcile modernity
What we have reviewed so far are the first two stages in the formation of the social. First,
from the height of a flourishing Greek public sphere that realized action could also be
nonviolent deed and speech, came the downfall. With action corrupted by rhetoric and
impending empires succeeding, Plato (and a legacy ofothers including Aristotle) worked
to preserve the vita contemplativa esoterically within a class ofphilosophers, meanwhile
leaving the rest of humanity to slavery. Secondly, Jesus' rebellion was to take back the
vita contemplativa nonviolently, but his work was co-opted and twisted to fit the needs of
the Roman Catholic Empire. His message to shake the Romans, Jews and anyone who
would listen, "Do not conform any longer to the pattern of this world, but be transformed
by the renewing of your mind,"124 was rewritten to be a heavenly covenant with him as
Ì 75
the son (and equivalent) of 'God'. Making the vita contemplativa into 'the holy spirit'
the Ecumenical Council corrupted Jesus' message, calling it the good news! No one had
to worry anymore about public chaos, because this God-man Jesus had brought a new
world order: Universal Christianity (Catholicism). All everyone had to do, if they did not
want to be put to the sword, was adhere to a new rigid metaphysical and superstitious
l23Ibid., p. 140.
124 New International Bible, Romans 12:2.
125 This is my own concept, which I am exploring in another publication, but is worth mentioning here.
There is a bit more expansion on this in Appendix III.
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rewording of Jesus' message in order to be accepted on Earth and in heaven. And with the
Romans recovering from disaster, on the surface, everything looked 'better than ever',
everyone was now "emboldened" to do good and conform to conventional morality;
resources and trade were thriving; civic infrastructure was becoming more permanent and
unified under one God. This increasing power of the social eventually led to the third
stage of the social's crystallization: consumer materialism in Marxist modernity.
Living together in communities, yet cut off from each other's true selves by
externally imposed moral standards for centuries, Arendt believes that without a proper
public space and opportunity to distinguish one's self, people developed deep seated
loneliness, superstition and gullibility - the "almost infallible signs of alienation from the
world."126 By the 19th Century, the social realm held little to no 'warmth' of what the
modern term 'social' implies.
The best way to evaluate Arendt 's criticism of modernity is through her analysis
of Marx, which is both respectful and critical. She respects him for the consistency ofhis
vision to empower the economically alienated victims of society by giving them a new
vested interest in community and property. She writes,
He was right in concluding that the "socialization of man" would produce
automatically a harmony of all interests, and was only more courageous than his
liberal teachers when he proposed to establish in reality the "communistic fiction"
underlying all economic theories.
The establishment of the social realm through Christianity implies a communal order
which all follow. Interests have been harmonized in this sense, but, as we have seen, this
community is problematic because people have been disenfranchised both politically and
economically through superstitious tradition that reinforces the common through shared
126 Arendt, 1958, pp. 187- 188.
127 Ibid., p.40.
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fear of divine justice. Although his earlier work looked critically at the alienation
involved in both religion and politics, Marx eventually chose to focus on the economic
aspect of the disenfranchisement.
Arendt considered Marx's view that political alienation was secondary to
economic alienation myopic. Although she agreed that the disconnect between man and
material had brought about a state and government of "pure administration/' she
believed that he was over-idealizing that a communist revolution reconnecting man and
material through labor would bring about a shift in consciousness. Of Marx, she
concludes, "he was wrong in assuming that only a revolution could bring it about, and
even more wrong when he believed that this complete victory of society would mean the
eventual emergence of the 'realm of freedom.'"129 I will now inspect more carefully
Marx's views on alienation and private property, and, using Arendt's analysis, explain
how those views contributed to forging the social into the rampant consumer society that
we experience today.
Although clearly Marx succeeded in inspiring the communist movement on a near
global scale, Arendt is highly critical of Marx for two main reasons. First, Marx's vision
was so centered on reconnecting humans to their own labor power (which had been
expropriated by capitalism) that it was doomed to ignore the need for humans to be
individually political:
To gauge the extent of society's victory in the modern age, its early substitution of
behavior for action and its eventual substitution ofbureaucracy, the rule of
nobody for personal rulership, ...was finally followed by the all-comprehensive




man as a whole, in all his activities, to the level of a conditioned and behaving
animal.13
Second, when Marx sought to offset the conversion of money to capital, he envisioned
private property merging into community identity and ownership. What was supposed to
be empowering was that the 'what's mine is yours and what's yours is mine' would
become an extension of the sense ofpersonal security of the self into the physical world.
But what actually happened was that the public actually extended deeper into personal
space, so that the body and finally, more modernly, sensation inside the body became the
last private space for the self. Arendt cannot forgive this establishment of encroachment
on the self; the retracted private space for self-actualization in labor and work; and the
ruination ofpublic space by opening it to private issues of labor and work, when it should
be a space of action, speech and cultivating freedom.
Marx's works are vast, but to review Arendt's criticisms, I have chosen to lay out
below in Marx's (1857) own words, from Pre-capitalist economicformations , the four
different relationships that are dissolved by turning labor into capital; and the effects of
transforming money into capital. Marx concludes that it is through the active process of
working with community land that a sense ofproperty is realized132. A community farm,
for example, where we would all work together, would give us a sense of identity and
ownership come harvest. But in order to make a system of capital and a system of money,
the laborer's relation to property is actually dissolved. Marx explains how this occurs:
The relationship of labor to capital or to the objective conditions of labor as
capital, presupposes a historic process which dissolves the different forms, in
which the laborer is an owner and the owner labors. . .
130Ibid., p.41.
131 Karl Marx. Pre-Capitalist economicformations (Trans. Jack Cohen; Ed. E. Hobsbawm). New York:
International Publishers, 1857, 1965.
132 Marx, 1857, 1965, p.92.
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(I)A dissolution ofthe relationship to the earth - to land or soil - as a natural
condition ofproduction which man treats as his own inorganic being, the
laboratory ofhis forces and the domain ofhis will. All forms in which this
property is found, assume a communal entity whose members, whatever the
formal distinctions between them, are proprietors by virtue ofbeing its members.
Hence the original form of this property is direct communalproperty [as defined
above].133
(2) Dissolution ofthe relations in which man appears as the proprietor of the
instrument. As the above form of landed property assumes a real community, so
this ownership of the tool by the laborer assumes. . . handicraft labor. . . .Here
labor itself is still half the expression of artistic creation, half its own reward. The
institution ofthe "master craftsman". ...
(3) ...the fact that man possesses means of consumption prior to production,
necessary in order to enable him to keep alive as a producer - i.e. in the course of
production, before its completion. . . .
(4) . . .dissolution both of the relations under which the laborers themselves, the
living units oflaborpower are still a direct part ofthe objective conditions of
production and are appropriated as such - and are therefore slaves or serfs. For
capital the worker does not constitute a condition ofproduction, but only labor. If
this can be performed by machinery, or even by water or air, so much the better.
And what capital appropriates is not the laborer, but his labor - and not directly,
but by means of exchange.134
One of the key causes for Arendt's writing The Human Condition, in my view, is to
expose the insidious progressive devaluation ofprivate property caused by the social.
This destruction ranges from the tribal sense of community private property through to
the Ancient Greeks' sense of ownership of private physical property to the dissolution of
the connection to the land, resources, and tools that Marx describes. Finally, it extends to
the last bastion ofprivate property in modernity: intimate sensation. But if Marx and




In Marx's Utopian vision of 'socialized mankind' there is no distinction between
labor and work. Arendt concludes that this levels everything down to labor: "all work
would have become labor because all things would be understood, not in their worldly,
objective quality, but as results of living labor power and functions of the life process."
The reduction and division ofwork into labor and the making of its products into
consumer goods has destroyed work's benefit of a sustainable and durable craftsmanship.
Mass production requires labor, not work. Thus, Arendt admonishes that to say we live in
a consumer society is to say we live in a society of laborers .
Arendt illuminates another contradiction of Marx's when he
insists that the labor 'process comes to its end in the product' : he forgets his
own definition of this process as the 'metabolism between man and nature' into
which the product is immediately 'incorporated,' consumed, and annihilated by
the body's life process.
Everything is reduced to this metabolic process of labor. With the 'release from the pain
of labor being the only happiness one can achieve isolated from the world, a human's
sense of existence is so compromised that there remains "only an irresistible distrust in
the capacity ofhuman senses for an adequate experience ofthe world - and this distrust
is the origin of all specifically modern philosophy."139 I believe the anxiety created by the
conditioned feeling that one cannot trust one's own senses is the catalyst of existentialism.
Work and labor are at odds in the modern scheme: homofaber, the craftsman,
coming into the public realm with products made in the private threatens a society based
on glorified labor, because the individualized and non-standardized craft products change
135 Arendt, 1958, p.78.
136 Ibid., p. 110.
137 Marx, Karl. "Des Prozess erlischt im Produkt" (Das Kapital, Vol.1, Part3, ch.5) in Arendt, 1958, p.89.
138 Arendt, 1958, p.89,
139 Ibid., p.98.
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the value scheme in an otherwise consumables market. On the other hand, once homo
faber 's innovations are replicable, teamwork threatens a society of craftspeople by
breaking up work into discrete jobs with a metabolic rhythm that begins with the
extraction of natural resources and ranges to the distribution of consumer products. The
preservation of novelty through trademark, copyright, and license is arguably the
hallmark ofpost-modern society. Yet, as we experience on a daily basis, the products that
most ofus come in contact with are not made with quality or novelty in mind. Whether it
is food, cleaning, hygiene, transport, energy, education or pornography, mass production
at cheap cost and distribution makes industries' ongoing metabolic consumption pattern
the priority.
What worries Arendt about Marx's vision is not human equality in the public
realm, but rather that the laboring class' occupation of the public realm is homogenizing
"all human activities to the common denominator of securing the necessities of life and
providing abundance."140 Resulting in a 'verdict of society,' all things must be done in the
name of 'making a living' - otherwise any activity unrelated to labor is a hobby . Not
only are professions that might challenge this verdict in rapid decline142, the work of the
exception, the artist, "who, strictly speaking, is the only 'worker' left in a laboring
society," is patronizingly regarded as 'play'
The fallacy of Marx's idealism, says Arendt, lies in the idea that with labor
emancipated, every man and woman "will automatically nourish other, 'higher,'
140 Ibid., p. 110.
141 Ibid., p.lll.




activities."14 100 years on from Marx, Arendt rings the alarm on this point. First, she
notes,
the spare time of the animal laborans is never spent in anything but consumption,
and the more time left to him, the greedier and more craving his appetites. That
these appetites become more sophisticated, so that consumption is no longer
restricted to the necessities but, on the contrary, mainly concentrates on the
superfluities of life, does not change the character of this society, but harbors the
grave danger that eventually no object of the world will be safe from consumption
and annihilation through consumption. 146
Secondly, with laborers occupying the public realm, "there can be no true public realm,
but only private activities displayed in the open. The outcome is what is euphemistically
called mass culture."147 The third is the worrisome consequence - in the form of a two-
sided coin ofhappiness and unhappiness that laborers demand stand on end - "where
life's processes of exhaustion and regeneration, of pain and release of pain, strike perfect
balance."148 Arendt comments:
The universal demand for happiness and the widespread unhappiness in our
society are among the most persuasive signs that we have begun to live in a labor
society which lacks enough laboring to keep it contented. For only the animal
laborans, and neither the craftsman nor the man of action, has ever demanded to
be 'happy' or thought that mortal men could be happy.149
Satisfaction and freedom to the actor or craftsperson comes from doing something
distinct or making something intended. Happiness, in contrast, is a manufactured fallacy
whose reference point is a nonexistent paradise that only has traction for those caught in a
conformist loop of endless repetitive labor and consumerism. This contradiction is
maintained and refreshed constantly through the 'boundary pushing' fashion and 'cutting
edge' technology industries, where humans are enticed by 'customizable' products that






promise happiness in the idealized world - the consumers are assured through marketing
and branding in the social public sphere that they are the priority.
Things that have the appearance of authenticity, but which really serve to threaten
any real novelty, are endless, and when successful are celebrated as 'franchises'. While the
'film industry' and 'television industry' produce new twists to old narratives, the 'music
industry' pumps pre-determined 'top 40' pop 'hits' to commercial satellite radio
franchises. The 'design industry' has become the go-to service industry of clever
"happiness in slavery"150 quips for disheartening conditions (who hasn't empathized
since the 1960's with the 'Hang on baby!' poster of the kitten struggling to hold on to the
branch). And the 'fashion industry' makes humans into walking billboards. Although
some of the expressions out of these industries may have (originally had) social
commentary punch, they are over laden with product placement, cross-promotion,
sponsorship, 'cradle-to-grave' branding. The enormous red, white and blue Tommy
Hilfiger logo clothing lines are no modest undertaking. Humans have come to associate
their own existences so closely to the products of these industries that they will sacrifice
their own money and homegrown values and ideas for the status-associated value of
mass-produced trademarked products - whose actual raw manufactured costs have no
clear connection to their retail prices. These branded products' value is based
capitalistically on 'target market' analysis. In other words, industry 'heads' will calculate
what they think they can get for products based on the 'style' they fabricate for a given
season, the product-release- 'window', and any association with previous franchising.
These industries have even further estranged the concept of authenticity, by identifying
their brands as 'the real thing' and the 'important thing to have'. Of course, one's
150 Trent Reznor, "The Downward Spiral", Long-playing music recording. Nothing Records, 1993.
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consumption of these 'authentic' products puts one in the associative camp of copy-cats
that conform to behavioral dictates reinforced and confirmed by market predictions. Punk
and anarchy movements stick out as an antithesis to the shadow following mentality only
long enough until they (images, shapes, sounds) are co-opted to become the revitalizing
objects behind new shadow maker campaigns, like Che Guevera T-shirts.
The story of the rise of the social is a pathetic and tragic story; our possibilities for
authentic action have been eclipsed and the public realm has become a place to conform
to norms of good behavior and exhibit new corporate-endorsed trends. Depending on
whether you believe Jesus died for the vita contemplativa151 or for Original sin', this
document could be considered a critical reviewer a blaspheme respectively. Regardless,
hopefully this has stimulated some reflection of how much we have lost since Ancient
Greece.
Conclusion Chapter 2
Arendt believes that human existence should be characterized by active and
contemplative living. This style of life was exemplified by the ancient Greek citizens who
combined contemplation (practicing philosophy) with the vita activa 's hierarchy of action,
work, and labor. The collapse ofAncient Greece's republic brought the inundation of
laborers and craftsworkers into the public realm and, with them, necessity: the antithesis
of the political. As the boundaries blurred between the public realm and the private realm,
the social realm was born and the path toward authenticity became obscured.
151 Because before I started writing this paper, I never thought I would have found respect for this Jesus of
Nazareth, let alone developed a theory for his rebellion to reinstate the vita contemplativa (see Chapter 5).
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Compounded by Christianity's embrace of Plato's 'eternal good' that made contemplation
the exclusive domain of the pious, left the struggle to overcome life's necessities
(housekeeping) as a publicly social task referred to as 'polities'. By obligating the
population to fulfill the will152 of the eternal (e.g.: the need to do 'good' to fulfill God's
commands) before its duty to the private - the social economy became a political
structure and therefore the foundation of active living. Consumed by their tradition and
the divine sanction of the eternal trinity that holds their common together forming the
morality bond that guides the world they make (through the faithful: laborers and workers)
and justice they proclaim, the pious then are those transfixed in the light of salvation,
giving over their active and contemplative selves and pledging their beings to reinforce
the eternal trinity through labor and faith.
More concretely for our purposes, likening it to "when housekeeping emerges into
the light of the public sphere, . . . [Arendt] maintains that as Roman and then medieval
Christian civilization developed, there was a change in the way in which the necessities
of life were handled."153 This means that through centuries of calcifying authority, the
public realm subverted any possibility of the polis or freedom reforming, because all that
existed was the necessity to survive, maintain order, and thus vie for power.
This chapter explored the challenges faced by the delicate relationship between
authenticity and the human condition. As work and labor migrate from the private to the
public, the resulting social realm redefines action and freedom; glorifies labor; multiplies
conformity; and undermines both the vita activa and the vita contemplativa. No small
threat to authenticity and action, the complexity of these circumstances unfold and
152 'The will of the eternal' to Arendt is where "the vita activa and the bios politikos [became] the
handmaidens of contemplation". Arendt, 1958, p.21.
153 Patricia Johnson. On Arendt. Belmont, California: Wadsworth/Thornson Learning, Inc., p.33, 2001.
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reinforce themselves for 2400 years. To call it a conspiracy would be ignorant ofwhere
historical forces have pushed us. What we have seen is that the development of Western
humanity has lacked personally authentic philosophy. Instead it has been on a Platonic
autopilot where the ingrained legacy to 'do good' by following conventional morality and
promote metabolic repetition through labor supersedes any consideration of the self's
distinction and authenticity. And while the esoterically devoted few practice one of
hundreds of branches of Platonic 'philosophy' twisted by years of re-interpretation, the
bulk ofhumanity follow the 'philosophy's' precepts through a conformist interface and
simply exist according to the necessities and demands of labor and work.
Doing what needs getting done, philosophy for most humans is an unchecked,
God-fearing, traditional faith-based regime154 (Christianity, Judaism, Islam, consumer
capitalism) that keeps everyone in basic order. Slotted firmly into marginal categories of
academia, poetry and entertainment, the original Ancient Greek public realm's
conceptions ofphilosophy, freedom and action expressed through oration, writing, and art
are therefore cultivated only by personal anxiety, public cultural funding (a la 1% for
culture) and through high-interest loans and great personal risk.
When the obsession with following conventional/conformist morality suppresses
the potential in humans to be craftsmen or women, artisans, and political beings, a serious
reconsideration must be made about adopting the precepts of such an ethic. In a public
sphere where private matters are laundered, homofaber continues to compromise his or
her work to fit more within a labor scheme. In addition, in such a 'public' (social) sphere,
154 Although there is a focus on Christianity in this thesis, both Islam's and Judaism's foundations are no
less unchecked as their obedience ethics also require the suspension of faith to appease the wrath of God.
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chaperoned by morality screamers, no one who just wants to raise their family in relative
peace wishes to be confronted for pushing behavioral boundaries.
Perhaps only wealthy eccentrics, who have tasted distinction and excellence, who
have the time to contemplate, and who can exist in their own private sphere or protect
their liberties with an entourage of attorneys, may resist conversion to such exaltation of
labor and consumption. Even Ralph Nader has been condemned in his film auto-
biography An Unreasonable Man155 for pushing for clearer individual rights (in labor,
work, speech and action), advocacy programs, and a multiparty American government in
the 'public' (social) sphere. Another class of resister is youth and students: those who
have some latitude and few responsibilities save to themselves. What is so alarming, is
how difficult it is to identify an organization whose work and progress is not
encapsulated in a doctrine that exalts labor excessively. What organization is not churning
out tools - either inanimate or human - that just continue a rhythmic metabolic process of
labor and consumption? Marx may have brought a great deal ofthe world out of
economic alienation, but I conclude that to do it, he had to abandon his position on the
problem ofreligious alienation and political alienation. As we have reviewed: in the
society envisioned by Marx, plurality is sacrificed for unity.
It feels important to end this chapter with a concluding note on the possibilities of
undermining the social and some inspiring words ofhope that are not so obvious within
the density ofArendt's writing. Humans, despite how they may be led to behave, are not
interested in becoming generic. In The Human Condition, Arendt provides us with a
narrative of the vita activa {labor, work and action) for the past two and half millennia
155 Ralph Nader (biography). An Unreasonable Man [motion picture], H. Mantel & S. Skrovan (writ., prod.,
direct.). USA: Submarine Entertainment, 2006.
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leading up into "what we are doing"156 in modernity. Arendt argues that the redefinition
of freedom' is a condition for subjective freedom through the experience of overcoming
oppression157. She asks us to abstain from compromising our selves and our lexicon. She
is resolute that we attend to pre-Socratic philosophy that had put the world (through
active engagement with the vita contemplativa) before the necessities of life, which we
have exchanged for Platonic (and subsequent corrupted Christian) morality that puts life
before the world. Here is Arendt's final concluding criticism (the underlining is mine) in
The Rise ofThe Social*5*, in which she so poignantly articulates the hope embedded
within our humanity to evolve from the social:
Not even the social realm - though it made excellence anonymous, emphasized
the progress of mankind rather than the achievements ofmen, and changed the
content ofthe public realm beyond recognition - has been able to altogether
annihilate the connection between public performance and excellence. While we
have become excellent in the labouring we perform in public, our capacity for
action and speech has lost much of its former quality since the rise of the social
realm banished these into the sphere of the intimate and the private. This curious
discrepancy has not escaped public notice, where it is usually blamed upon an
assumed time lag between our technical capacities and our general humanistic
development or between physical sciences, which change and control nature, and
the social sciences, which do not yet know how to change and control society.
Quite apart from other fallacies of the argument which have been pointed out so
frequently that we need not repeat them, this criticism concerns only a possible
change in the psychology ofhuman beings - their so-called behavior patterns -
not a change of the world they move in. And this psychological interpretation, for
which the absence or presence of a public realm is as irrelevant as any tangible,
worldly reality, seems rather doubtful in view of the fact that no activity can
become excellent if the world does not provide a proper space for its exercise.
Neither education nor ingenuity nor talent can replace the constituent elements of
the public realm, which make it the proper place for human excellence.
In the mid 1 9th Century this problem began to touch something deep enough in a few
individuals to enable them to begin developing existentialist ideas. This movement was





ready to face the discomfort ofnot knowing the future rather than to continuing to
conform to conventional morality schemes. It was a movement that was ready to admit it
could not fulfill the conduct religion required, yet was sure there was some way to find
freedom without it being at the cost of responsibility. It was a movement that felt more
free in ambiguity than in the absolute.
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Chapter 3 - By definition, existentialism rejects inauthenticity.
In this chapter, I will explore different interpretations of existentialism and clarify how
the search for authenticity is at its root. To review existentialism I have chosen the works
of renowned Nietzsche scholar and translator Walter Kaufmann, UCLA philosophy
professor and Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (in
1 960) Abraham Kaplan, and curriculum philosopher Van Cleve Morris to provide
perspectives from three disciplines. As I review existentialism from Kaufmann, Kaplan,
and Morris' perspectives, three main concepts will emerge: existence precedes essence;
freedom lies in a responsible plurality; choice is paradoxically dreadful and thus only
authentic decisions and actions are satisfactory. Kaufmann (1956) introduces
existentialism (to Anglophones) in a compilation of translated pieces working to
recontextualize political philosophy as an inward effort towards will and freedom rather
than the traditional science ofpolitical control. Calling all others existentialists or
philosophical analysts, Kaufmann reserves philosopher status solely for Friedrich
Nietzsche160 giving an enormous boost to existentialism's relevance and visibility. Kaplan
(1961) reviews existentialism - giving it full philosophy status - in a lecture series of
world philosophies and religions. Morris (1966) reviews existentialism's theoretical and
practical relevance to education while calling for a foundational review of curriculum
tenets that maintain the learner as object rather than subject.
160 Kaufmann, 1956, p.50-5 1. Although Nietzsche's initial and false association with Nazi fascism may
have been a problem for existentialism at the time, he is now academically exonerated of the association.
[The rest of this footnote is a bit garbled.] and for the continued reverence his attacks on Christianity's
'corruption of reason' receive, Nietzsche's political philosophy status puts him on par (according to
Kaufmann, Lampert, Hutter) with Socrates, continues to heighten existentialism's status and revitalize the
movement.
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Defining existentialism is not impossible, but it requires (i) certain paradoxical
latitude to leave questions and interpretations open without the need to forcibly reconcile
them (especially via run-of-the-mill edicts, models and philosophical infrastructure) and
(ii) some elbow room because existentialism is working to dissociate itself from systems,
tenets, and definitions. These 'open' allowances do not make existentialism obscure or
obtuse, however. As we will see, existentialism clearly stems from dissatisfaction with
the way life is going.
Over the last 150 years a resonant despair has defined the impact of existential
writing as it has penetrated the surface of our modern context and the bleak destiny of the
proletariat [common citizen]. Existentialism was not founded in an academic context,
although some existentialists are scholars. Rather, it all started with individuals rendering
their overload of intensely personal anxiety: a communal or even global crushing anguish
internalized and explored through writing. The rejection of essentialism and
predestination appears as the common result of confronting this anxiety and wondering
what life would be like if existence preceded essence: Ifwhat one did defined one's
essence. Being literate and having a burning need to reconsider existence was not
exclusive to a single background as we review some of the key Western existentialists:
Pascal (Catholic); Kierkegaard (Protestant); Dostoevsky (Greek-Orthodox); Nietzsche
(anti-Christian); Sartre, Jaspers, Heidegger (atheists); Arendt (Jewish); Rilke (Christian -
but portrayed Jesus born to Mary Magdalene); Kafka (Jewish); Camus (absurdist?);
Merleau-Ponty (phenomeno logist). And their 'spiritual' positions are at once beds of
paradoxes and yet quintessential for existential reflection, struggle and reform. Kaufmann
calls "the heart of existentialism"
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the refusal to belong to any school of thought, the repudiation of the adequacy of
any body ofbeliefs whatever, and especially of systems, and a marked
dissatisfaction with traditional philosophy as superficial, academic, and remote
from life.161
And with the rejection of the 'existential' label by some of them, if there is "one essential
feature shared by all [of them, it] is their perfervid individualism."
I will show how existentialism is the vanguard for a global assault on the
inauthentic. Existentialists' writings are assaulting because they are renderings of internal
strife and the reconciliation to go public about it. What they propose is unsettling in the
least, but to most it delivers a swift punch of sublime introspection to the gut. In this
chapter, drawing upon the works of Kaufmann, Kaplan and Morris, I will outline three
key characteristics of existentialism that I believe provide a battery to test authenticity.
These three characteristics are: 1 . Essence preceding existence is fundamentally
problematic. 2. Ambiguity is an approach to the anguish one struggles against to
reconcile responsible freedom (as opposed to capricious freedom). 3. A conduct ethic
compromises character and individuality - privately, publicly and socially.
Existence preceding essence
Essence can be understood as an object's and a concept's defining feature. The smell of
jasmine, the taste of pomegranate, the predatory instinct of a wolf, the efficiency of a
computer, the rejuvenation of a bed, the pull of gravity, the trust of friendship, the
unknown of fear, the pain of shame, the rhythm of a drum, the tone of a cello. For any of
these things listed above to exist, the essence is needed first to define it. Essence is
connected to purpose. Why a table? Because one wants something off the ground. Its
161 Ibid., p. 12.
162 Ibid., p.] 1.
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purpose predates its need. Pain predates shame as trust predates friendship. The cello,
sitar, or voice are needed to guide the intended tone into melody, harmony and music.
Basic essentialism is gender determinate, i.e. what a woman is or what makes a man a
man. But it also extends to conditions humans are born into like denomination,
nationality, astrological sign, and other categorization, like being or not being 'a math
person'. Existentialists do not believe that a human's essence is a predetermined feature,
and they feel that what it means to be human is sanguine. So taking it to task they strip
away all the essential ideology to bare basics.
By essence, existentialists mean one's defining quality or character - and
embedded therein, whether one knows it or not, is one's conception of freedom. To
conceive of anything does not make it exist, but it does define it, it attempts to portray it -
it gives it its essence. Existentialists argue this is true of everything except humans.
Abraham Kaplan (1961) offers:
As Sartre formulates it, "man is nothing else but what he makes of
himself". . .Only man is not subject to the law of identity. Man is the one existent
ofwhich we cannot say he is only this and nothing more. In the very act of
becoming aware of the particular 'this' that he is - whatever is may be - the
human being has already transcended it. Man is the being whose existence
consists in continuously transcending itself. Man's existence is constituted by this
fact: that he is continuously becoming what he was not.
Thus, Kaplan reckons, "Because man's existence precedes his essence, no definition of
man is possible."164 Yet, whether it is friendly advice, a spiritual sermon, a website banner,
a TV commercial, or educational guidance, we live in a world full of definitions about
what a man is and what a woman is based on how he or she behaves. Sometimes these
definitions come with the best of intentions but other times these definitions can range
163 Kaplan, 1961, p. 104; Sartre quote not cited by Kaplan.
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from trying to sell a product or service to outright indoctrination. Regardless, they come
from outside the self and seek to determine behaviour. Definitions are part of language,
which is part of work, which is what makes up the world. We are asked to take many of
these definitions at face value or taught that by integrating them into our selves the world
will be an easier place to navigate, because by being or 'acting' a certain way will affect
our class, our standing, our prestige, our status and our chances. Our own definition of
human being is caught up in the rest of the world's interpretations of human being, better
human being, worse human being, and models ofbest and worst. The existentialists
believe we are controlled by these definitions and a long standing and unconscious
collusion with essentialism. Dostoevsky points out that most of these people think they
are active as they are under "direct" influence of these external definitions and models.
I repeat, I repeat with emphasis: all "direct" persons and men of action are active
just because they are stupid and limited. How explain that? [sic] I will tell you: in
consequence of their limitation they take immediate and secondary causes for
primary ones, and in that way persuade themselves more quickly and easily than
other people do that they have found an infallible foundation for their activity and
their minds are at ease and you know that is the chief thing. To begin to act, you
know, you must first have your mind completely at ease and no trace ofdoubt left
in it.'65
What happens when I wake up to a world that has promoted and taught me self-deception?
What happens when I realize that education has defined the shape of my own humanity
(for me) and I now have doubts? If essence precedes my existence and is therefore
defining who I am, what is it to wake up to this? As Morris asks, "What comfort is it to
be told that one belongs in the world merely to round out the system?"
165 Fyodor Mikhailovish Dostoevsky, Notes from the Underground (C. Game«, Trans.). In Existentialism
from DostoevsL· w Sartre, W. Kaufmann (Ed.). New York: Meridian Books, 1956, p.64-65.
166 Morris, 1966, p.34.
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Kaplan identifies that existentialism's attack on existing philosophy is not just
critical of "shortcomings of other philosophies, but to failures in politics, economics, and
social organization in general.167" He notes, "In one direction, man has been pushed aside
on behalf of a depersonalized Nature; in another, on behalf of a transcendent Deity; and
in a third, on behalf of a State both depersonalized and transcendent." Faced with an
alienating pre-made modern world for rent, "indifferent - if not downright hostile - to
human aspiration, . . .existentialism seems to speak to a man in such a situation so as to
allow him to come to terms with a life of almost unbearable anxiety and despair."
To Kaplan, what makes existentialism continuously relevant, fresh and classically
philosophical, is that it endeavors to not only describe and evaluate "what it calls 'the
human condition'"170 but it also insists that "philosophy is not a body ofpropositions but
a way of life."171 Although it brings up difficult issues, making raw what others have
been smoothing over, existentialism seeks to find a way through the negative by focusing
on shaping one's own future. This means that by engaging in existentialism one has taken
a step to confront one's own interpretations and where these interpretations come from.
No one would take such a difficult step away from convention if they did not believe that
by doing so they would find at least more freedom than what they already consider
themselves to have Even if it was a religious person who converted to a new religion that
was even stricter than their current religion, they would be ready to endure stricter dogma
conceiving a value that would free them from difficult choices or would have them
167 Kaplan, 1961, p.98.
168 Ibid., p.99.
169 Ibid., p.98.
170 Ibid., p.99. ...although he claims it as existential, Kaplan does not actually cite the term 'the human
condition'.
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working toward a future freedom in life or 'the afterlife'. This brings us to existentialists'
conception of choice, values, and freedom.
Inventing freedom with responsible choices
According to Kaplan, it does not make sense to think of choice as a virtue. Deciding to do
something because it is virtuous puts essence before existence and is inauthentic. What is
important is that the decision made is genuine to the individual; otherwise, a real bid
towards freedom is not made. "The meaning of life lies in the values whieh we can find
in it, and values are the product of choice. . . .a human being must. . . decide for himself
what his life is to be."172 As Sartre says, "You are free, therefore choose - that is to say,
invent. No rule of general morality can show you what you ought to do: no signs are
vouchsafed in this world."173
But what if we said that "humans create values'? There is a difficulty here. The
problem with saying that humans create values is if they have set out premeditatively to
do so. By the common way of looking at 'creating' we might adopt the essence of a
preexisting value or make things or fabricate situations that "exhibit pre-existent
essence."174 However, genuine creation or invention is possible. Invention, here, follows
the line of Sartre's conception of artistic freedom175, a creativity that is unhindered by
rules. Setting critique and rules aside, the artist invents something, brings something into
existence. This is only a metaphor as art parallels existentialism's invention of value, but
the point is not to argue here whether the existence ofpieces of art precede their values
172 Ibid., p.105; no citation by Kaplan of Sartre.
173 Jean-Paul Sartre, "Existentialism is a humanism". (P. Mairet, Trans), In Existentialism from Dostoevsky
to Sartre, W. Kaufinann (Ed.). New York: Meridian Books, 1956, p.297-298.
174 Kaplan, 1961, p. 105-1 06.
175 Ibid., p. 107; Sartre not cited.
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and essences. To stay on the point, just as choices make one human, one's choices are
also part ofwhat makes up humanity. Therefore, under the existentialist framework, our
choices collectively define the essence of a living and growing humanity, one that "is
continuously becoming what [it] was not,"176 one we can argue here aims to be free.
But not every choice is equally valid. Although most existentialists reject a
behavioral ethic, it does not mean they seek to be unethical or ethical to one's self alone.
Kaplan makes a distinction between an existentialism of responsible freedom and beat
poet existentialism that believes in freedom to choose whatever desire befits the moment
or "to conclude that being authentically an individual requires that you be like no one else
on earth, that you choose what no one else would conceivably choose." Kaplan links
existential freedom contingently to inner values and choosing for one's self with a
responsibility to the community of others who make responsible choices. The realization
that a lie perpetrates a perpetual negative effect and consequence on humanity and that
the truth (or closest thing to it, as we will not assume that truth can be known absolutely)
is a pledge towards freedom and trust, is to make good on the Kantian realization that
"truth can do without falsehood, but the lie cannot live without truth. IfI choose to lie I
bear the responsibility ofmaking all men dumb. In every choice I am responsible for the
fate of all mankind."178 This clarifies the feeling of anguish in existentialism: it is the
weight of duty to humanity felt by those who recognize what moves humans towards
freedom versus what moves humans towards useless necessity. Kaplan comments:
It is the realization that in making a choice for himself he is thereby choosing the
course to be pursued by mankind. This is why Kierkegaard says we choose only
"in fear and trembling," why he speaks of the "dizziness of freedom," why Sartre




says that man is "condemned" to be free. ...And so, Sartre says, there are (besides
existentialists) only two kinds of people in the world: those who try to escape
from freedom and those who try to deny responsibility - cowards and stinkers.
To escape this responsibility, one pretends freedom is impossible; affecting no control
over what happens, as 'victims of fate,' one even calls for pity when the necessity to
make choices catches up with him or her. To deny responsibility is to acknowledge
freedom while telling others not depend on you: "The bell does not toll for me, and you
need not weep at my funeral. .. .you are your own keeper, not I."180 This leaves then only
a romantic few whose '"individuality/" according to Dostoevsky, '"is really
revolting."181
Kaplan therefore concludes that self-deception - in polar opposition to
existentialists' 'virtue' of integrity - is humankind's greatest vice .
Life, Jaspers says, is a drive towards honesty, toward really being what we are.
Mere things, as you recall, are wholly subject to the law of identity; for man,
identity is something to be achieved. A man who is identical with himself - with
his human self, the self which he has made by his free and responsible choices -
such a man existentialism calls "authentic." Existence, in the special sense which
the existentialist gives to this term, is, as Jaspers puts it, the will to be authentic.
Only the authentic man really is what he is, because only ofhim is it true that who
he is has made him what he is rather than the other way around.
As Arendt pointed out184, when we represent ourselves, our lexicon without intention (or
'will' as Jasper puts it) has us describing the 'what' as merely a series of qualities. Thus,
if I were to describe myself self-deceptively, I might say, "I am a fine upstanding world
citizen with a golden heart, who recycles, has an obsessive eye for detail and a sweet
tooth". IfI described myself authentically - more who I am - 1 might say, " I am an
179 Ibid., p. 108-109.
180IWd., p. 109.
181 According to Dostoevsky (uncited), in Kaplan, 1961, p. 110.
182 Kaplan, 1961, p.100-111.
183IWd., p.lll.
184 Arendt, 1958, p. 169.
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underachieving white protestant male, so lost in his entitlement that it took half my life to
realize that my Judeo -Christian sense ofdoing good and forgiveness has me playing a
guilt/rewards game resulting in self-sabotage in a continuous string of squandered
opportunities most minorities would give a limb for." Thus, the intention-to-be-authentic
can be identified as an action: a very personal, subjective, paradoxical and anxiety
provoking action, because when 1 describe my inauthenticity - who I am - in one action,
I lose the support system ofmy identity and free myself from self-deception.
For Morris ( 1 966), before we realize that we are talking about existentialism, we
acknowledge a philosophical mood that comes through the raising of certain questions
from authentic doubt "as to whether any particular faith - in a metaphysic, in a logic, in
whatever - can be fully certified [by "empirical philosophies"]."185 Morris comments on
the consequences of this mood:
[We] begin to see that some of our understandings about men and the world do
not come to us from metaphysics or logic; they come to us from ourselves. They
are known somehow internally without the assistance of any intellectual formulas
or prepositional grammars. It is these understandings with which Existentialism
starts. Three of them-Human subjectivity, Paradox, [and] Anxiety
generate all Existential thinking and therefore require special attention.
According to Morris, in human subjectivity we put the general Existential hypothesis
'existence precedes essence' which has already been discussed above. Unlike the
everyday items we produce and consume that require design before product and therefore
are in essence before existence, Morris argues that we are in existence developing our
essences:
One cannot ask the question: What did God have in mind when he created man?
without realizing that any answer must issue from man's own lips. Man is
therefore in the odd position ofbeing his own designer or essence-giver. And, we
185 Morris, 1966, p. 1 1 .
186 Ibid.
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may ask, what is the essence of a being who creates his own essence? The answer
must be that this is always an open question, to be answered by every individual
in the process of living his life and thereby giving meaning and essence to his
existence.187
Once again, this brings us back to the importance of choice - which is subjective. Instead
of trying to force existence and essence to be empirically tangible, Morris concludes that
"if 'being' is undefinable [sic], let it remain."188 He is not saying that 'nothingness' or
'being' should be denied altogether, rather he opts that we relieve ourselves from
"concocting some odd logic by which nothingness is made into something." Let
'being', 'non-being' or 'nothingness', all understood by human subjectivity - like 'time'
- not be diminished just because their essences are undefinable.
Practically speaking, a social system or educational curriculum that asks its
citizens and students to assume functions of character that will predefine their existences
with a disregard to making essence development a priority, not only fosters deceptive
inauthentic collusion, it trains them to forfeit their (existential) selves. For example,
requiring students to bury gripes and forcing them to 'see' the benefits of grueling
repetitive drills asks them to assume a false objectivism while denying any qualities
derived from their subjective experience. Kaplan agrees: "The man who lacks
authenticity is indeed playing a role: his existence has yielded to an essence which
defines what he is. In a sense, self-deception is impossible: he who lives in deception no
longer has a self to deceive."
187 Ibid., p.13-14
188 Ibid., p. 20.
189 Ibid., p.21.
190 Kaplan, 1961, p. 111.
Ambiguity: The Reciprocal feeding of paradox and anxiety
Opening to subjectivity allows the import ofparadox and anxiety to surface in existential
discourse. Byparadox, Morris reminds us that we can think at once that, 'the universe
would not be the same without me,' and yet ? would be delusional to think that I had any
significance whatsoever'. "This, then, is the paradox, and every man must live with it. It
is to know two things about oneself: (1) that one is of absolute value in the world, and (2)
that one is of absolutely no value whatsoever.''191 To live with this paradox, to return to it
when the tendency is to reconcile it and to return to it when asking, 'who am I?' and 'why
am I here?', is the heart of ambiguity in existentialism.
For Morris, existentialism comes from internal understandings - beyond
metaphysics and logic. It comes from embracing the anxiety of life's pressures! It is the -
expression of the genuine discomfort that comes from the inability to escape the human
condition. Ifwe were to focus on or become conscious ofour possible annihilation, our
sudden lack of existence, our nothingness, we could identify with the symptoms that "can
easily set offdeep tremors in [our] spirit. Kierkegaard spoke of it as 'fear and trembling';
Heidegger, as Dread; Sartre, as Nausea."192 These are all deep seated expressions of
anxiety. Morris cautions that we could "very easily misunderstand Existentialism right at
this point."193 He asserts that in the face of metaphoric anxiety we must not "lapse into a
state of metaphysical blues. Rather, as a philosophy, it summons us onward, beyond these
initial psychic states, to a new level of awareness: of self, of freedom, of choice, of




responsibility, of authenticity."194 Thus, the question ofvalues and freedom is raised
again through this paradox.
Morris postulates that because values are based on choices justified by merely
other choices previously made, there is no ultimate foundation for my choices. He
comments, ". . . since I can turn to no certifying agency to finally justify me in my choices,
I discover that my choices are without base. They cannot be justified. I am a baseless
base of values."195 How can this existential 'ground zero' not be frightening when the last
thing in our social economy that anyone wants to be is insecure or to appear incompetent
and even abject? Can this starting point be converted from ominous to reassuring? At first
blush, existentialism seems to be presenting a foundation of vulnerability - it seems to be
condoning a rejection of values. Values that most have come to revere and depend on to
make choices. Seemingly, to make public or admit that one does not know how to make a
decision, invites intense judgment and condemnation from the rest of the world
(especially to Sartre's stinkers and cowards). To them, having a baseless base ofvalues
with no certifying agency is a nightmare that goes against all convention of security. How
can this ambiguity be made into a practical and empowering existential space to return to
and not one to fear?
To have nothing, to claim no foundation, is existential, but giving into passivity or
ambivalence is not. To question or reject external certifying agents, if sincere, is a strong
independent action. The very deed will shift one's existence into a learning process of
discovery. To be unsure about external influences and to probe into their agendas is a




where he or she recognizes external certifying agencies. . . where one realizes that a
collusion has been taking place - where a part of the self (knowingly or unknowingly)
has been given over to necessity to fulfill the agenda of the external certifying agent. We
perpetuate the essential world without any regard for developing our own essences.
Starting an agonistic discourse ofwhy and how external influences dominate one's life is
only the beginning.
The characters, narratives, and essences that we have taken to be our own have
seemed so clearly defined, but only as stark silhouettes in the light ofthe external agent.
To turn off this light is to be existential. To remove this light is to stop a 'follow the
leader' dance of shadows. Where existentialism seemed vague and ambiguous next to the
sharp contrast of essentialism, the shadows cast are only sharp in their two-dimensional
forms. In the world of shadow making and following, mirroring others is vital to survival
and upward mobility of status. One's shadow puppet skills are critical to forming
imitations. To move up society's ladder we need to be clever at copying the classic
(essential) forms or if we really want to appear original we recontextualize a few classic
shapes into a 'new' unified icon. Big slaps on the back await! But we are not two
dimensional cardboard cut outs! Where do we go from here? As in making animal shapes
in front of a white projector screen, the only way to augment one's form then is to make it
bigger and sharper by going closer to the light. Common literary themes and
psychological problems revolve around this idea ofpeople losing themselves - consumed
by the light, if you will - as they try to fit themselves into the flat cookie-cutter molds of
modern icons. People kill themselves (inwardly, and even outwardly) as they make
pretzels of themselves trying to match the forms of the magazine body, of model
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happiness, ofhaughty nobility, ofWall Street power, of sacred piety, of the helpless
victim, etcetera. In the end, these essential contortionists are at best flat imitations of a
moment, an apex, a legend, a postcard.
Sadly, modernity's iconography is so injected with 'hipness' or 'coolness' that
social-acceptance is more about maintaining a façade than being your self. As no one
would want to be called a 'FAKE!', they will, in order to not lose face, maintain their
pose of inauthenticity to the grave. In contrast, instead ofbeing drawn to the flame like
moths, where essential shadows only become larger and sharper and potential existential
tools wilt and curl, the existentialist moves farther from the 'public' lights where their
shadows become more ambiguous - where there is paradoxically more clarity and less
anxiety. Here there is new latitude in the paradox of losing security of singular or dual
identity and yet finding freedom in formlessness - the opening to the multidimensional
self or plurality.
Conclusion of chapter three
Where inquiry into and rejection of external certifying agencies do not linger in the
necessities of the social economy, but instead focus on communal responsibility to the
self and the other, politics and freedom become approachable in the ancient Greek
'fashion'. When we move on from certifying agents, and gauge our own sense of labor
(survival) and work (the world), we gain a clearer idea ofacting without the necessity to
behave while surviving in the world. We get a clearer picture of the selfs context and
where the self fits in the communal narrative and discourse. As modes of sincere
discussion, inquiry and rejection form an existence from which proceeds self-certification,
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and a new (ethic of) character and narrative define one's essence, like the artist rejecting
rules and critique, any man or woman can step boldly forth to define themselves; they can
decide to be responsible for themselves and humanity's freedom. Sure, due to deeply
ingrained morality and societal programming, they will lapse back into reliance on
essences, but something substantial has been experienced. The taste of self is felt, and not
as an insecure reject, but rather as a rejector who defines. Thus, the paradox of the return
to baselessness is then felt to be less daunting. Eventually, once understood as 'self
invention', an action of reversing the essence-precedes-existence model, this returrris
only empowering. A development of self can proceed where the individual derives
strength from not being judged, relinquishing the need to maintain façade and self-
judgment via ambiguity, and by identifying those who share responsibility in the search
for freedom. Authenticity is thus to be aware of one's freedom. Morris remarks:
Unless an individual is aware ofhis act of choosing, he is not a free
individual. ...awareness, choosing, and freedom are interlocking notions. ...they
must be present in the same degree. And they finally come together in the
awareness ofone 's ownfreedom in the act ofchoosing.
Therefore, paradox cannot be understood without its effect on character and the plurality
of choice among a community of individuals who work within the same ethic of building
character through plurality. The paradox that they are consumed by anxiety by their
groundless freedom to choose from a plurality of choices ends up bringing definition,
essence, and character to their existences as their actions define them. In Existentialism is
a humanism, Sartre rebukes some of the critics of existentialism who allege that this
philosophy is passive:
You have seen that it cannot be regarded as a philosophy of quietism since it
defines man by his action; nor as a pessimistic description of man, for no doctrine
196 Ibid., p.47.
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is more optimistic, the destiny of man is placed within himself. Nor is it an
attempt to discourage man from action since it tells him that there is no hope
except in his action, and that the one thing which permits him to have life is the
deed. Upon this level therefore, what we are considering is an ethic of action and
self-commitment.1 7
Sartre (b), 1956, p.302.
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Chapter 4: Congruent curriculum initiatives toward authentic living
If education is to be truly human, it must somehow awaken awareness in the
learner - existential awareness of himself as a single subjectivity present in the
world. In practical terms, it refers to his awareness ofhis own precarious role as a
baseless chooser who cannot escape choosing, and therefore creating, his own
personal answer to all normative and moral questions that come up in his
classroom or in his experience outside of school.
This chapter will briefly review two educational initiatives that strive toward authenticity
by creating time, space, and opportunity for self-realization, reference and authentication.
In particular I will look at The David Lynch Educational Foundation's Transcendental
Meditation Program199 and Outward Bound200 a nature, adventure, retreat program. After
reviewing each program's historical milestones and research findings, I will focus on how
Transcendental Meditation (TM) is a return respectively to the vita contemplativa and
Outward Bound (OB) is a return to the vita activa. Each program also reciprocally
promotes the other way of life, meaning it would be hard to separate one vita from the
other, at least as far as education goals are concerned. IfI have done justice to the
previous chapters' discourse, the implications of future combined programs that
reciprocally feed off each other will be clear.
Self-authentication and contemplative living through Transcendental
Meditation
The David Lynch Educational Foundation's Transcendental Meditation Program
promotes quiet periods twice per day in schools to reduce stress and improve academic
198 Morris, 1966, p.l 10-1 11.
199 : ©Transcendental Meditation and TM are service marks registered in the US patent and trademark
office, licensed to Maharishi Vedic Development Corporation and used under sublicense.
200 Outward Bound was founded by Kurt Hahn and Sir Lawrence Holt in 1941.
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success. Brought to the West by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, it is more than just "the smart
person's bubble bath"201; the research connected directly to TM now impacts many
mental, emotional and physical fronts throughout medical, sociological, and educational
disciplines. Despite the time that needs to be set aside to do it, the simple, natural, non-
religious technique of TM "allows the mind to experience finer levels of the thinking
process until the mind transcends and experiences the source of thought, the simplest
form of human awareness,"202 described as the Unified Field ofNatural Law.203 Travis,
Arenander, & DuBois (2004) showed that "increased orderliness ofthe functioning of the
brain and the experience of a profound state of 'restful alertness"'204 during the practice
ofTM is significant and measurable. According to the David Lynch Foundation for
Consciousness-based Education and World Peace website, over 20 million dollars has
been granted by the US National Institutes ofHealth for Transcendental Meditation
prevention-oriented health research.205 Data from hundreds of scientific studies at over
200 independent universities and research institutions show a wide range of educational
benefits from TM including increased attendance, intelligence, creativity, efficiency of
information transfer in the brain, calmness, and self-development; improved memory,
201 Steiner, Joel. "Just Say Om", from Time Magazine, August 4, 2004. Taken 3/4/2010 from "Just Say Om"
webpage: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9 171,1 005349- 1 ,00.html
202 Nidich, 2009. Comes from a press document sent to me by Dr. Sanford Nidich representing (The David
Lynch Foundation) Transcendental Meditation/Quiet Time Program at the Maharishi University of
Management, Fairfield, Iowa.
203 Roth, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's Transcendental Meditation, online book, Ch. 2, 1987.
204 Travis, F., Arenander, ?., & DuBois, D. "Psychological and physiological characteristics of a proposed
object-referral/self-referral continuum of self-awareness". Consciousness and Cognition, 13, 401-420, 2004.




mind-body coordination and academic performance; and decreased behavioural issues,
anxiety, substance abuse, and depression .
Particularly relevant to this thesis is the program's research on Increased
integration ofpersonality207 including increased self-confidence, self-actualization,
efficiency ofperception and memory; improved problem solving ability, left (verbal and
analytic thinking) and right (synthetic and holistic thinking) hemisphere functioning; and
increased field independence - increased resistance to distraction and social pressure .
Most of these are self-explanatory and very positive for self-development, but 'increased
field independence' is ofparticular interest. Distraction and social pressure are wide
ranging, but ifTM builds resistance overall to these features, then, in combination with
the other benefits provided by TM, the self has a real fighting chance! As meditation
promotes existence first, developing essence is abiproduct. So, instead of essence
comingfirst and deriving "existing, nothing but existing"209 - which was why Jimi
Hendrix concluded that "I Don't Live Today" - meditation's existencefirst derives
essence and therefore leads to living.
In my view, the 20 minute pauses taken in school (currently 50,000 strong in
public and private schools210) are a direct (re)connection to the vita contemplativa. Its
affect on students' active life and studies, I identify as a spring board to self-
206 David Lynch Foundation: For consciousness-based education and world peace (2009). Taken 3/4/2009





209Hendrix, Jimi. "1 Don't Live Today' from Are You Experienced? A long-playing music recording. MCA
Records, 1967.
210 David Lynch Foundation: For consciousness-based education and world peace (2009). Taken 3/4/2009
from "Home" webpage: http://www.davidlynchfoundation.org/home.html, 2009, p. 1 .
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authentication. But what happens exactly during TM? How does 20 minutes of silent
sitting, a seemingly inactive waste oftime, result in empowerment and self-authentication?
With hundreds of celebrated independent investigations, a review ofTM research
milestones will help contextualize its recent adoption into education.
'For 30 years, meditation research has told us that it works beautifully as an
antidote to stress,' says Daniel Goleman, author of Destructive Emotions, a
conversation among the Dalai Lama and a group of neuroscientists.' But what's
exciting about the new research is how meditation can train the mind and reshape
the brain.' Tests using the most sophisticated imaging techniques suggest that it
can actually reset the brain, changing the point at which a traffic jam, for instance,
sets the blood boiling.
Attention deficit disorder (ADD) is all the rage... now for decades. But instead of
looking at policies that would minimize external distraction and keep violence, reality
television and in-your-face media advertising at a more digestible pace, children are
drugged or put in special classrooms that minimize distraction. While this might be good
for pharmaceutical companies and insurance agencies, public education programs are
generally under-funded and under-staffed and these young children are caught in a
struggle between discovering their inner selves (whose natural chemistry is interrupted by
foreign substances) and navigating through the outer world (which is full of artificiality).
In a special report issue of alternative ADD therapies in Additude Magazine, Maggie
Jackson (2008) relays that the core of executive attention is developed in the brain
between the ages of four and seven212. Meditation is now recognized as a non-intrusive
affordable way to develop executive attention. Although, in my view, it is important to
differentiate between meditation in schools as self authenticating practice of the vita
contemplativa and meditation in schools to counter ADD or boost memory, learning
211 Goleman, Daniel, 2003, in Steiner, 2003, webpage 2.
212 Jackson, Maggie. "Brain training" Additude: Life with ADHD made easier Magazine. Winter, 2008.
pp.39-40.
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meditation at a young age may be useful. Lidia Zylowska co-founder ofUCLA
psychiatry's Mindful Awareness Research Center, is very optimistic about meditation in
schools:
Attention is such a basic skill that children need, and to be able to impact that skill,
to teach them how to redirect their attention and how to become more aware of
themselves, their bodies, emotions and thoughts - it's an exciting thing. It's also
critical.213
Public education policy makers need to be at the forefront ofunderstanding and
reviewing 'attention' as a skill and it needs to be understood as an integral part of self-
authentication as a discipline.
Ifwe put self-authentication as a priority in education, we will need to reconsider
how we structure curriculum. Although a complete overhaul that weaves the usual
science, math, language, art, physical education and humanities into a curriculum infused
with self-authentication, I do not fear a little-by-little approach like we see with the TM
programs of20 minutes twice a day where students dip into the vita contemplativa.
Sociologist Georges Friedmann (1970) has this to say of sitting quietly:
To take flight every day! At least for a moment, which may be brief, as longs as it
is intense. A "spiritual exercise" every day - either alone, or in the company of
someone who also wishes to better himself. Spiritual exercises. Step out of
duration. . .try to get rid of your own passions, vanities, and the itch for talk about
your own name, which sometimes burns you like a chronic disease. Avoid back
biting. Get rid ofpity and hatred. Love all free human beings. Become eternal by
transcending yourself.
This work on yourself is necessary; this ambition justified. Lots ofpeople
let themselves be wholly absorbed by militant politics and preparation for social
revolution. Rare, much more rare, are they who, in order to prepare for the
revolution, are willing to make themselves worthy of it.214
213 Zylowska, 2008, in Jackson, Maggie. "Brain training" Additude: Life with ADHD made easier Magazine.
Winter, 2008. p.40.
214 Georges Friedmann, 1970, in Hadot, 1995, p.81.
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Let us be realistic in assessing Friedmann's plea: it is not about children. But its implicit
content is what makes it even more important as an advisory notice. He, in no uncertain
terms, implies that by the time we are adults, many very disturbing, intolerant, automatic,
false and negative forces have crystallized in us. In my opinion, meditation is a strong
springboard into self-authenticating, but it is not enough.
With their vita contemplativas invoked by meditation, students must engage in
their community — they must also develop their vita activas! Although this can and will
be done in the usual context of school and community, it is my belief that the deepest
realizations will come when students are removed from their usual worldly (artificial)
context and placed in a natural space where they must engage in much more raw and
simple survival conditions. In the urban environment, a great deal of a student's full-time
life is spent simplifying and managing internally and individually the complexities of the
outside world. In the natural environment, the context is reversed: the outer world is
simplified and survival is paramount. With only a few key goals like navigating terrain,
finding shelter, keeping clean and nourishing the body, the complexity falls away,
bringing the inner self into the shared communal space. Where the weakest person in a
surviving group represents the overall strength of the chain, one's active and
contemplative lives are thrust into challenge. For those reading this who have had the
opportunity to travel, we can see how this parallels the old edict that 'you haven't really
gotten to know someone until you've traveled with them'. Where films have popularized
this 'coming to terms with the self while learning to deal with others' process through the
road-movie, it is generally an adult context. But what about the idea of educational nature
trips where the guides are trained to provide students with the opportunity to engage in
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the vita activa and where the process of self-motivation goes hand-in-hand with
strengthening the community? Welcome to Outward Bound!
Active living and reflection through Outward Bound
Leading outdoor education expeditions for over 60 years, Outward Bound (OB) now
hosts over 70,000 people (predominately students) annually215' Although experience and
value-centered educational principles have been at the heart of the Outward Bound
program from its inception, there have been a number ofefforts to explain and expand
upon the Outward Bound philosophy in pedagogical terms, including Walsh and Golins'
(1976) OB Educational Process Model216 and Sakofs and Armstrong's (1996) Active
Learning Cycle217 based on Kolb's learning cycle218 (1984). In the current 'holistic'
model, the values, design principles and outcomes of the "Outward Bound Educational
Framework"219 {see Appendix IV: Outward Bound Educational Framework) are derived
from modernization of the program with an anchor in founder Kurt Hahn's personal
legacy and philosophy.
Hahn oversaw the development and expansion of Outward Bound from 1920 until
his death in 1974. During this time Hahn had set himself an educational mission to
provide youth with an opportunity to develop authentic skills of respect, leadership, and
healthy living that could translate across to any field the student decided to pursue.
215 Outward Bound. Taken 2/7/2009 from "About Outward Bound" webpage:
http://www.outwardbound.org/index.cfrn/do/ind.about, 2009.
216 Walsh, V, & Golins, G. The exploration ofthe Outward Boundprocess. Denver: Colorado Outward
Bound School, 1976.
217 Sakofs, M., & Armstrong, G.P. Into the classroom: The Outward Bound approach to teaching and
learning. Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1996.
218 KoIb, D.A. Experiential learning: Experience as the source oflearning and development. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984.
219 Outward Bound. Taken 3/4/2009 from "Philosophy: The Outward Bound Mission and educational
framework" webpage: http://www.outwardbound.org/index.cfrn/do/ind.about_philosophy, 2009, pp. 1-2.
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Originally full-time boarding schools, over the years Outward Bound has taken many
forms including day campuses, and as I experienced it in California in the 1980's the
guides would show up to our school and take us in vans into different wilderness areas
and wildlife refuges. Strategically placed inside or along natural parks or wilderness areas,
the practical side of each campuses' community commitment is as a rescue service. To
Hahn, learning to survive in nature is to understand the self and discover respect for
nature and others. By sending students out on guided day trips and extended backpacking
trips, Hahn developed an organic curriculum that uses the challenges of the natural
environment to provoke communication, collaboration, problem solving and conflict
resolution. Plurality, ambiguity and distinction are easily identifiable by the intention
former OB director John Mitchell relates to keep the OB experience from becoming
teacher-centered (or guide-centered): "We don't appoint or elect formal leaders but expect
individuals with particular skills to take on this role for the duration of the situation that
requires solving. Leadership is thus changed as the group moves from problem to
problem."220
By the late 1 960's Outward Bound growing legacy brought a new wave ofcareers
for nature enthusiasts becoming the pet project ofvarious educators, psychologists and
sociologists. Critical to the OB program was the equivalent emphasis given to active and
reflective time. As sports psychology Professor L.M. Lefebvre points out of the Belgium
school he started in 1977,
The approach is a scientific one, using carefully supervised and measured
methods ofAction and Reflection, with much verbal and nonverbal
communication between the participants and instructors. Everyone is encouraged
John Mitchel in Wilson, 1981, p.46.
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to reflect upon their experience and use the conclusions constructively.
By the late 1970's, alternative outdoor education had really caught on and a
number of academic researchers and enthusiasts canonized Outward Bound. Giving it his
stamp of approval, Haverford Professor of Psychology Douglas Heath (1981) hailed
Outward Bound U.S.A. "a case study of hope!"222 Heath recognizes that without the
proper self-authenticating foundation, students and educators both suffer in the usual
curriculum: "...too exclusive an emphasis on only reading, writing and arithmetic that
ignores a youth's sense of self, values, and interpersonal skills too often distorts healthy
growth and ultimately blocks mastering even the three "r's" themselves." He also
recognizes that the natural environment provides an opportunity to open up to the self and
to others in a way that urban conditions shutdown and-divide. In his own words:
". . .today's youth grow up isolated not just from nature - its unpredictability, its
wilderness, its solitude, but also from others."224 A worldwide phenomenon, Outward
Bound now "offers a whole-school reform model to more than 1 50 elementary and
secondary schools throughout the [USA]."
While a straightforward interpretation of the modern framework's design
principles to "incorporate reflection and transference [and learn] from success as well as
failure"226 and the outcome of "character development's increased self-confidence and
self-actualization" and "living a healthy and balanced life"227 have obvious implications
221 L.M. Lefebvre in Wilson, 1981, p.56.
222 Heath, Douglas. "Introduction." In Outward Bound U.S.A. (J. Miner & J. Boldt, Authors) New York:
William Morrow & Co., Inc., p. 11, 1981.
223 Ibid., p.9.
224 Ibid., p. 10.
225 Outward Bound. Taken 2/7/2009 from "About Outward Bound" webpage:
http://www.outwardbound.org/index.cirn/do/ind.about, 2009.
226 Ibid., p. 1.
227 All listed items, Ibid. p. 1 -2.
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for the self, it is critical to this thesis to think past the first degree of the framework when
considering other parts we typically interpret as related to outward or external group
dynamics. In other words, the principles helping to reconcile outward dynamics, such as
compassion; inclusion and diversity; goal setting, guiding and achieving; collaborating,
communicating, solving problems and resolving conflicts effectively; social and
environmental responsibility228 must also be considered in terms of reconciling inner
plurality of the self.
I believe Outward Bound works to bring students in and out of ambiguity - to
understand themselves as both minute and irrelevant and grand and quintessential. This
process helps strengthen active living, the identity within plurality of the individual, and
confidence in a group. When taken out of an urban environment and placed in the wild,
students are put in more direct contact with ambiguity. Through isolation and a
simultaneous focus on basic survival, they realize their irrelevance in the cosmic scheme
and yet utter relevance in relationship to group survival. Removed from their usual urban
social circumstances and conditions, a new set ofreflections and impressions from the
vita contemplativa arrive where the v.a. is forced to make its way in a new environment.
Although the juxtaposition between different living conditions is valuable, it is even more
nutritious if students have already been thinking beforehand, in their curriculum, about
the vita contemplativa and vita activa, perhaps through meditation!
Consider the contrast between a program like Outward Bound and standard
education. Although there are sure to be a number ofvariations, the modern face-front,
parallel wall, teacher centered (at the front of the room) classroom is common if not
prevalent. In A Portal to media literacy229, Michael Wesch (2008) presents the results of a
student based evaluation (he carried out with his cultural anthropology students at Kansas
University) of the classroom environment and values surrounding the modern learning
experience. Referring to their multimedia, internet-connected amphitheatre classroom,
that could be the envy of all modern schools, as a "room designed for an information
dump, not for discussion,"230 Wesch reports that 'if the walls could talk' in the modern
classroom environment, they would say:
Q To learn is to acquire information
? Information is scarce and hard to find
? Trust authority for good information
? Authorized information is beyond discussion
? Obey the authority
Q Follow along231
Even worse, Wesch reports that when students get to the smaller more intimate
classrooms they bring the expectations they developed in the larger rooms. He says we
can understand the reason for students' expectations by paying close attention to the kinds
ofquestions students ask.
? How many points is this worth?
? How lone does this paper need to be?
2^2? What do we need to know for this test?
These questions relay that students have not only adapted a limited set of non-discussion
type questions-the questions outline the narrow path of learning they need to navigate to
survive their environment. Most interesting for the purposes of this thesis is that all the
expectations and questions all relate to or seek external validation. And his students are
229 Wesch, Michael. A Portal to media literacy. A presentation made at University of Manitoba. Taken
4/20/2009 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J4yApagnr0s&feature=channel, 2008.
230 Ibid., minute 6:00.
231 Ibid., minute 6:30.
232 Ibid., minute 7:36.
85
college students. That means they have been hammered with this behavior ethic for at
least a decade and have successfully adapted to it!
If combined with a self-certifying vita-contemplative-building Transcendental
Meditation program, Outward Bound would not only be receiving students more prepared
to benefit from guided outdoor adventure education, it would be able to expand on the
values, design principles, and outcomes of its philosophy (revisit Appendix IV). Although
I respect the Outward Bound philosophy, like anyone who thinks they need a religion to
know what to do, but it suffers from a pre-made external framework. In order to show
how the program could be beneficially revised to reflect the principles explored in this
thesis, I have revised the current Outward Bound guiding principles. A new Outward
Bound Educational Framework that might look something like the following.
Revised Outward Bound Educational Framework 2010, by Z.A.Reznichek
Values
Wc teach to and work by these values:
We guide and work by these values:
Compassion Freedom
—Demonstrating concern and acting with a spirit ofrespect and generosity in service to
others
—Striving for survival, distinction, and freedom with a recognition that it will grow
strong in the selfonly as it is nurtured by and with others who share in the experience.
Integrity Distinction
—Acting with honesty, being accountable for your decisions and actions
—Expressing sincerity, becoming aware of the influences that corrupt my decisions and
actions.
Excellence
—Being your best self, pursuing craftsmanship in your actions, and living a healthy and
balanced life
—Finding your distinct voice, committing to sincerity with it and demanding sincerity
from your fellows no matter how agonistic.
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inclusion and Diversity Balance and Natural Diversity
—Valuing and working to create communities representative of our society that support
and respect differences
•—Valuing and working inwardly and together on self-certification to create balanced,
healthy communities that we can export to the larger society.
Design Principles
We use these principles to design and deliverprograms:
Learning through Experience
—Facilitating engaging, relevant, sequential experiences that promote skill mastery and
incorporate reflection and transference
-—Learning from success as well as failure
Challenge and Adventure
—Using unfamiliar settings to impel students into mentally, emotionally and physically
demanding experiences
—Utilizing and managing appropriate risk
Supportive Environment
—Designing an experience that supports physical and emotional safety
-—Developing a caring and positive group culture
Outcomes
These are the outcomes common to all ofourprograms and what we measure:
Character Development
—Demonstrating increased self confidence and self actualization
—Demonstrating increased self-validation, self-confidence, and self-actualization
—Demonstrating compassion toward others and living a healthy and balanced life
—Demonstrating self-certification and agonistic friendships.
Leadership Self-authentication
—Demonstrating the ability to set goals, and inspire and guide others to achieve them
—Demonstrating the ability to set goals, but being patient and ready to adapt to the
realtime narrative, and seeing that guidance comes from self-authentication and
forgiveness toward the self and the group.
—Demonstrating the ability to collaborate, communicate, solve problems and resolve
conflicts effectively
—Demonstrating the alchemization ofnegative emotions through sincerity into
motivational energy that inspires the self and others to collaborate, communicate, create
solutions and resolve conflicts effectively.
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Service Self-actualization
—Demonstrating social and environmental responsibility
—Assuming communal responsibility.
—Actively engaging in service to others
—Actively engaging in the vita contemplativa.
When we considered (in chapter 2) that philosophy was originally (in pre-Socratic
Greece) practiced by everyone and was in part the vita contemplativa, it was prior to the
moral infusion of neo-Platonic need to do good and untainted by God-fearing tradition
and lexicon. By Hadot's Philosophy as a way oflife can we reconsider philosophy for
everyone, by removing words like "sin", "God" and "Lord"? Because we might be able
to glean the original practical advice of Dorotheus of Gaza before the vita contemplativa
and philosophy of the individual was high-jacked by 'future founding' philosophers:
We ought not only to examine ourselves every day but also every season, every
month, and every week, and ask ourselves: "What stage am I at now with regards
to the passion by which I was overcome last week?" Similarly every year: "Last
year I was overcome by such and such a passion; how about now?" The Fathers
have told us how useful it is for each of us to purify himself in turn, by examining,
every evening, how we have spent the day, and every morning, how we have
spent the night.233
From my experience with 15 years of daily meditation, I find this examination process to
be naturally occurring. I conclude as well that this parallels Transcendental Meditation's
finer thinking that "transcends and experiences the source of thought, the simplest form
of human awareness"234 (the Unified Field ofNatural Law235).
233 Dorotheus of Gaza, circa 540 A.D., in Hadot, 1995, p. 134-135.
234 Nidich, 2009. Comes from a press document sent to me by Dr. Sanford Nidich representing (The David
Lynch Foundation) Transcendental Meditation/Quiet Time Program at the Maharishi University of
Management, Fairfield, Iowa.
235 Roth, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's Transcendental Meditation, online book, Ch. 2, 1987.
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Although I am critical of the Outward Bound philosophy and find it too Christian
and Platonic, the value of students immersed in another context is, on the whole, a
progressive and holistic alternative experience. Renate Wilson reports that OB staffare
not all satisfied with the results of the program. "Purists among them feel that Outward
Bound needs a moral shakeup"236, but the double standard she goes on to describe of OB
leaders living different lifestyles than students, points to why the Platonic/Christian value
system will always be limited and constrained. With a deep investigation into the side-
effects ofour bloated social realm, and with a strong commitment to sincerity,
authenticity and contemplation will hopefully become pillars of future curriculum
philosophies. In the meantime, Outward Bound and Transcendental Meditation may not
be a total-solution to the problem of authentic education, but they are steps in the right
direction.
236 Renate Wilson. Inside Outward Bound. Vancouver: Douglas & Mclntyre, p. 165, 1981.
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Appendix Ia: Ecclesiastes 3: A Timefor Everything
1 There is a time for everything,
and a season for every activity under heaven:
2 a time to be born and a time to die,
a time to plant and a time to uproot,
3 a time to kill and a time to heal,
a time to tear down and a time to build,
4 a time to weep and a time to laugh,
a time to mourn and a time to dance,
5 a time to scatter stones and a time to gather them,
a time to embrace and a time to refrain,
6 a time to search and a time to give up,
a time to keep and a time to throw away,
7 a time to tear and a time to mend,
a time to be silent and a time to speak,
8 a time to love and a time to hate,
a time for war and a time for peace.
9 What does the worker gain from his toil? 10 I have seen the burden God has laid on men.
11 He has made everything beautiful in its time. He has also set eternity in the hearts of
men; yet they cannot fathom what God has done from beginning to end. I know that
there is nothing better for men than to be happy and do good while they live. That
everyone may eat and drink, and find satisfaction in all his toil—this is the gift ofGod.
I know that everything God does will endure forever; nothing can be added to it and
nothing taken from it. God does it so that men will revere him.
15 Whatever is has already been,
and what will be has been before;
and God will call the past to account.
16 And I saw something else under the sun:
In the place ofjudgment—wickedness was there,
in the place ofjustice—wickedness was there.
17 I thought in my heart,
"God will bring to judgment
237 New International Bible, Ecclesiastes 3.
both the righteous and the wicked,
for there will be a time for every activity,
a time for every deed."
18 1 also thought, "As for men, God tests them so that they may see that they are like the
animals. 19 Man's fate is like that of the animals; the same fate awaits them both: As one
dies, so dies the other. All have the same breath; man has no advantage over the animal.
Everything is meaningless. 20 All go to the same place; all come from dust, and to dust all
return. 21 Who knows if the spirit of man rises upward and if the spirit of the animal goes
down into the earth?"
22 So I saw that there is nothing better for a man than to enjoy his work, because that is
his lot. For who can bring him to see what will happen after him?
Appendix Ib: Ecclesiastes 3 [No subtitle]
1To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven:
2A time to be born, and a time to die; a time to plant, and a time to pluck up that which is
planted;
3A time to kill, and a time to heal; a time to break down, and a time to build up;
4A time to weep, and a time to laugh; a time to mourn, and a time to dance;
5A time to cast away stones, and a time to gather stones together; a time to embrace, and
a time to refrain from embracing;
6A time to get, and a time to lose; a time to keep, and a time to cast away;
7A time to rend, and a time to sew; a time to keep silence, and a time to speak;
8A time to love, and a time to hate; a time ofwar, and a time ofpeace.
9What profit hath he that worketh in that wherein he laboureth?
10I have seen the travail, which God hath given to the sons of men to be exercised in it.
11He hath made every thing beautiful in his time: also he hath set the world in their heart,
so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end.
12I know that there is no good in them, but for a man to rejoice, and to do good in his life.
King James Bible, Ecclesiastes 3.
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13And also that every man should eat and drink, and enjoy the good of all his labour, it is
the gift of God.
14I know that, whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever: nothing can be put to it, nor
any thing taken from it: and God doeth it, that men should fear before him.
15That which hath been is now; and that which is to be hath already been; and God
requireth that which is past.
16And moreover I saw under the sun the place ofjudgment, that wickedness was there;
and the place of righteousness, that iniquity was there.
17I said in mine heart, God shall judge the righteous and the wicked: for there is a time
there for every purpose and for every work.
18I said in mine heart concerning the estate of the sons of men, that God might manifest
them, and that they might see that they themselves are beasts.
,9For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them:
as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no
preeminence above a beast: for all is vanity.
20AIl go unto one place; all are ofthe dust, and all turn to dust again.
21WhO krioweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth
downward to the earth?
22Wherefore I perceive that there is nothing better, than that a man should rejoice in his
own works; for that is his portion: for who shall bring him to see what shall be after him?
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Appendix II: Historical Timeline 509 B.C.E. to 529 A.D.
509 B.C.E. The Roman Republic underway, lasting about 500 years
508 B.C.E. Democratic institutions arise in Athens
477 B.C.E. Delian League Treasury founded
454 B.C.E. Delian League Treasury moved to Athens; Greek Empire formed
431-421 B.C.E. Peloponnesian War, first phase
414-404 B.C.E. Peloponnesian War, second phase
411 B.C.E. End ofThucydides account of the Peloponnesian War
404 B.C.E. Athens surrenders to Spartans
399 B.C.E.
324 B.C.E.
The death of Socrates; Plato became a critic ofAthenian Democracy
calling instead for a Republic ruled by philosopher kings
The Greek Empire began to break down upon the return ofAlexander
the Great to Babylon _
280 B.C.E. The Roman Republic begin warring with Greece
146 B.C.E. The Roman conquest of Greece
83 B.C.E. Platonic Academy closed after death of Philo of Larissa
27 B.C.E.
0-20 A.D.
The Roman Empire took hold
A Jewish man grows up along a trade route in Nazareth hearing news of
the world and gleaning a Hebrew education
20 A.D.
36 A.D.
Something does not sit well for this Jewish man, referred to historically
as Jesus. He and followers begin to challenge Roman and Jewish
compromise of the vita contemplativa. Most common word he is
239quoted as saying, "Awaken!"
After open rebellion in defiance ofboth Roman civic rule and Jewish
religious tradition, Jesus is crucified without resisting. A clearly public
and distinct action; biblically the accounts resound that this action was
also made after great contemplation
36 A.D. + Followers of Jesus, known as apostles travel in different directions to
related through parables - the least persecutable - the sacrifice ofJesus
for the renunciation of a society that has reserved the vita
contemplativa solely for philosophers.
64 A.D. Apostle Peter (Simon) carried word of Jesus Christ to Rome where he
was persecuted, thrown into slavery and crucified upside-down. As a
martyr, Peter was recognized as the first Pope and eventually the
gatekeeper ofheaven (depicted with keys in Christian artwork)
33-65 A.D. 'Paul the Apostle' a fanatic so worried that Jesus had died in vain
developed and spread the first major corruption of Jesus'
teaching/rebellion called 'original sin' where suddenly everyone had
239 As we will see in Chapter 5, what makes this man's actions, according to the scriptures, so unrealistic is
that the Roman Catholic Empire made Jesus the poster boy of Original sin'. What 1 argue to be an entirely
more realistic and fathomable reason to die nobly and distinctly without resistance is that his message -
which has survived in tireless accounts - to "Awaken!" was not just to wake up to be programmed and
behave as a labor tool, but to contemplate for one's self and fulfill one's active life as a free political plural
human! Yet, he apparently died as a sacrifice for Adam and Eve's Original sin'? For not doing what 'God'









something inherently wrong with them and needed to be resolved
through a communion with Jesus Christ (the Logos of one God)
NeoPlatonists Clement ofAlexandria and Origen fused Platonic
philosophy with Christian doctrine to create Christian Universalism
Dawn of Crisis ofthe Third Century saw the Roman Empire in decline,
unrest and debauchery turning over emperors sometimes in only
months. Meanwhile, Christian missionaries and martyrs (and Jews)
continued to persist and be persecuted
The "Great Persecution" by Emperor Diocletian saw scriptures burned,
treasures and property seized, officials demoted and priests imprisoned
Persecution by Romans ended for Christians. Christianity takes hold in
Roman Royalty, most critically Helen Augusta (later Saint Helen)
mother of Constantine I
Roman Catholicism is formed as Constantine returned all 'church'
property via the Edict ofMilan and over the top ofByzantium he built
Constantinople the new Roman Catholic capital of the Eastern Roman
Empire as the 'center of learning, prosperity and cultural preservation'
where his mother would collect Christian relics sparing no expense.
One such preservation was to build the new Church of the Holy
Apostles over the site of a temple to Aphrodite.
Council ofNicea establishes Jesus Christ as equivalent of God, a direct
consensus of300 bishops that reject Arius ofAlexandria's opposition of
there being a human equivalent of 'God'. Jesus' sacrifice of self to
Roman crucifixion is co-opted and a rewrite of his story begins where
Original sin' is central to his deification and logos
Revived Neo-Platonic Academy
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Appendix HI: My Theory on the life ofJesus
I never, ever, ever thought it would ever come to this, but through the contemplative
process of this thesis and all the research that went into it, I would like to offer a new
theory on the life of Jesus. Even as a child, before I could start piecing things together, I
felt Christianity was corrupt and that Jesus, if he existed, was simply a wise man whose
teachings were distorted and exaggerated over 2000 years. But now I come to see
something else when I consider the narrative of the New Testament's creation/edition and
the agenda ofthose who formed the Roman Catholic Church. Ifyou are conditioned to
accept the story and the metaphysics (superstition) that surround it, then critical
consideration of the narrative has little opportunity to develop (and is of course
sacrilegious).
Why would it not be possible that a man living under Roman occupation
recognized that the vita contemplativa had been highjacked and was being abused by the
power structure? That is not totally out of this world, what so ever. Nor that he demanded
that it be returned, meanwhile telling everyone he saw and met that they needed to
"awaken" and that they were in an actual and metaphysical prison ofwork and labor.
Regardless ofhow we look at the New Testament Bible, this man was a shit -disturber and
full of revelations - not the moon turning to blood kind, but the kind that comes from
contemplation: going into the desert, into the mountains, sitting quietly. It was a quiet and
simple revolution that was changing everybody who got in touch with it.
Is it coincidence that this man was crucified at what seems to be within ten years
of the formation of the Roman Empire (under Julius Cesar) in 44 A.D.? Empires do not
form because the government and people are rejoicing together. Romans had just been in
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a period ofRepublic, therefore it had been in a more free-thinking tolerable time. But
they had just about enough of anyone trying to bring back any kind of action in the public
realm. The only ones allowed to have any form of 'distinction' were the legislators and
the emperor - molded as we have said by the philosophers.
And if platonic philosophers got hold of the writings of Jesus' disciples, why
would they have done anything but rewrite it as it would serve them best - in the name of
the Roman Empire? So what then? The Romans reformed? How ridiculous is that? Think
about it: Roman Catholicism? The way the crucifixion is written in the Bible, the Romans
are just carrying out the will of the people, even laying it on the Jews. The new form of
'polities', as we know it, made its first real coup d'etat by rewriting itself out of the
oppressor role and spreading the incredible story of a man who could do all sorts of
supernatural things. And all the things that he did, he did as a sacrifice for original sin -
contemplation.
The Council ofNicea in 325 A.D., which was one of the first councils to meet
after the Romans adapted 'Christianity' was no small affair at over 300 bishops. By the
review of a priest named Arius (c. 250-336) - who asserted "the primacy of the Father
over the son and thus rejected the doctrine of the trinity" 240 - they chose to glorify the
life of Jesus 'Christ' and made him, if we follow my line of thinking, the poster-child of
Roman Catholicism by establishing the trinity that consummated the role ofhumans in
eternity and would condemn any ney sayer such as an Arian (one who agreed with Arius)
as a heretic. Thus began the wars ofRoman Catholics and The Goths (those who agreed
with Arius) that shaped Europe.
240 William Uzgalis. "John Locke", The Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, 2007, URL =
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/
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William Uzgalis (2007) points out that John Locke and Isaac Newton noted that
from this historical point Church and State were merged and that in Locke's Letter on
Toleration one main theme was that "there should be a separation between Church and
State."241 My point is that there are academics who see either in part or whole what I am
proposing, but I am more concerned with the idea that Jesus had almost wrestled back the
vita contemplativa, he even made himself a martyr, which was obviously an enormously
powerful act of distinction and excellence in the public realm. But the twist is that the
philosophers manipulated his story into cavaliering their own. And that is what most
people think to this day.
241 Uzgalis, 2007.
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Appendix IV: Outward Bound Educational Framework
Values
We teach to and work by these values:
Compassion
—Demonstrating concern and acting with a spirit of respect and generosity in service to
others
Integrity
—Acting with honesty, being accountable for your decisions and actions
Excellence
—Being your best self, pursuing craftsmanship in your actions, and living a healthy and
balanced life
Inclusion and Diversity
—Valuing and working to create communities representative ofour society that support
and respect differences
Design Principles
We use these principles to design and deliverprograms:
Learning through Experience
—Facilitating engaging, relevant, sequential experiences that promote skill mastery and
incorporate reflection and transference
—Learning from success as well as failure
Challenge and Adventure
—Using unfamiliar settings to impel students into mentally, emotionally and physically
demanding experiences
—Utilizing and managing appropriate risk
Supportive Environment
—Designing an experience that supports physical and emotional safety
—Developing a caring and positive group culture
Outcomes
These are the outcomes common to all ofourprograms and what we measure:
Character Development
—Demonstrating increased self-confidence and self-actualization
—Demonstrating compassion toward others and living a healthy and balanced life
Leadership
—Demonstrating the ability to set goals, and inspire and guide others to achieve them
—Demonstrating the ability to collaborate, communicate, solve problems and resolve
conflicts effectively
Service
—Demonstrating social and environmental responsibility
—Actively engaging in service to others
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